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There is a current gap in the literature regarding uniform and consistent standards and 
policies for addressing criminal hacking at the international level.  The purpose of this 
quantitative dissertation was to explore the relationship between individuals in the public 
and private sectors and their attitudes toward the need for international law defining 
criminal hacking and the penalties associated with the act.  Since the advent of 
information and communication technologies, there has been a need to address security 
holistically.  The security and sustainability of evolving technologies are examined in 
light of the threat landscape of criminal hacking, privacy concerns, and policies and laws. 
Role theory in connection with empathy served as the theoretical base for the research. 
Data were collected through an anonymous survey of 228 respondents from cybersecurity 
related organizations from public and private employment sectors.  The data analyses 
resulted in no significance among the groups of employment sectors and the independent 
and dependent variables, although there were statistically significant results between age 
groups, gender, infrastructure affiliation, and hacking ability among the questions of the 
study.  Proactively addressing and securing global societies from criminal hacking is 
paramount in helping to alleviate escalating economic and personal losses among 
organizations and individuals worldwide.  The research insights can be used for positive 
social change in drafting and implementing cyber policies and laws for criminal hacking 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Today’s virtual landscape has consistently evolved with the advent of newer and 
emerging technologies.  There is a need for legislative bodies, law enforcement agencies, 
and public and private sector organizations to make significant strides in collaboratively 
addressing security issues that have escalated from the exponential technological growth 
over the past several decades.  Ghernaouti (2013) illustrated the vastness of information 
and communication technologies (ICT) and the power they enable.  This power is 
achieved on both sides of the legal spectrum, while the ultimate power can be described 
as the ability to harness the digital technological infrastructure realm for responding to 
various machinations (Ghernaouti, 2013).  Dixon (2007) showed there is more to 
addressing security issues in the information technology realm, which surpassed the use 
of technologies to secure the environment and encompassing a comprehensive approach 
to education and policy. 
The cyber world has no boundaries and the interconnectivity of technologies has 
posed many threats.  Multinational efforts, including the United Nations, the Group of 
Eight, International Telecommunications Union, and the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, have addressed cybersecurity and critical infrastructure 
protection toward a global standard approach, which will take time (Segura Serrano, 
2015).  More specifically, there is a need for consistent multinational collaboration in the 
policy realm for clearly defining criminal hacking and the punishments for committing 




Oh and Lee (2014) explained the need for specificity in the realm of criminal law 
for penalizing acts of criminal hacking. Oh and Lee (2014) found that the degree to which 
hacking crimes are penalized should be closely evaluated, due to the variations of the 
crime and the damages caused, to help in determining appropriate punishments.  In their 
study, Oh and Lee (2014) evaluated the attitudes of respondents in the public and private 
sectors through anonymous individual surveys, focusing on the development of a 
consistent international standard that would serve as the rule for global societies in 
defining and prosecuting acts of criminal hacking to glean insight or new knowledge that 
could be used for future studies. 
The world has changed and evolved in the way global societies function on a 
daily basis, including the usage of many technological devices that create vulnerabilities 
and risks for the user.  Buchanan (2016) showed how the “cybersecurity dilemma,” 
which encompassed defensive and offensive intrusions among nations and the 
sometimes-unintended consequences that resulted in these acts. This illustrated only a 
piece of the holistic picture that represented technological intrusions and potential 
ramifications involved in the virtual realm.  
All users of virtual technologies need to be aware of the vulnerabilities of the 
technologies and how risks, involving the security of individuals, properties, 
organizations, and nations come into play.   Cavelty, Mauer, and Krishna-Hensel (2007) 
explored documentation from the World Summit on the Information Society from 
December 12, 2003, which stated the action plan of coordinative efforts among the public 




promoting initiatives for educating the population toward being aware of the threat 
landscape and building a security culture.  This chapter provides a synopsis of the 
background of the connecting elements of the study, which included the threat landscape 
of criminal hacking, security issues involving virtually connected devices, privacy issues 
in relation to criminal hacking, and the challenges of global coordinative legislative 
efforts for creating and implementing legislation for the punishment of criminal hacking. 
Additional sections for the chapter provide a comprehensive foundation for the study.  
In the realm of cybersecurity and policy, there is a need to explore individual 
public and private sector attitudes toward having an international law that defines 
criminal hacking and the penalties associated with the crime, so legislative efforts can 
better address the problem of criminal hacking in the cyber realm. McDonald (2002) 
explained how risks and uncertainty have substantially increased on the global scene due 
to all processes involved in globalization.  Although many insights have been studied, 
McDonald (2002) concluded that a successful policy approach toward a democratic 
governance response will entail considerations that include proactively engaging 
interactions among the public administrators, while understanding our fallibilities.  This 
study provides a framework that connects the threat landscape of criminal hacking with 
the security of global networks and connected technologies, and the security and privacy 
of all who rely on connected technologies in the modern-day era to help promote uniform 
policy solutions for the punishments of criminal hacking.  
The theoretical foundation for the study is role theory, in tandem with an 




obligations of future generations and the well-being of global society.  The research 
questions in this study were used to examine attitudes toward the need for establishing an 
international law for a global definition of criminal hacking, attitudes in establishing an 
international law for regulating punishments for criminal hacking activities, and attitudes 
toward the extent criminal hacking should be penalized.  Definitions for the study, 
assumptions, scope and delimitations, limitations, and the significance of the study can be 
seen from the brief synopsis provided on the criminal hacking threat landscape.  A 
holistic overview of the connecting entities that comprise interdisciplinary and 
multidisciplinary domains was used to address the problem of the study in Chapter 1, 
which provides a foundation for a detailed examination of the connected pieces in 
Chapter 2. 
Background 
The background briefly summarized literature in relation to the study of criminal 
hacking and policy efforts toward creating and implementing legislation and for the 
crime, the threat landscape of cybercriminal hacking activities in relation to privacy and 
security, and why there is a need to study multinational standards for the punishments of 
criminal hacking.  The scope of the study fell under the umbrella of cybercrime, which 
embodies many categories and methodologies.  The study specifically addressed the 
crimes of hacking and the penalties associated with the crime, while the attitudes 
implementing effective policies and laws on an international level were examined.  
When developing policies and laws, there is a need to holistically understand the 




evolution of hacking, the following is an introduction to what has become a multibillion-
dollar criminal activity worldwide (Internet Security Threat Report, 2017).  A glimpse of 
the speed at which the technological landscape has matured and morphed is illustrated, 
and vital elements lay a critical foundation for the study. 
Examples of cybercrime can be seen as far back as 100 years ago, described Hill 
and Marion (2016), with a cyber-hacking incident involving Morse code.  Nevil 
Maskelyne, an inventor and magician, born over 150 years ago, hacked a demonstration 
of the emerging technology of Morse code at London’s Royal Institution Theater in 1903 
without the knowledge of the demonstrators, John Ambrose Fleming and his friend 
Guglielmo Marconi (Hill & Marion, 2016).  Maskelyne intercepted the Morse code 
message and changed it to display something other than that intended, which showed the 
audience the technology was vulnerable to security issues, including privacy (Hill & 
Marion, 2016).  The Morse code example shows how humans can figure out inventions 
and manipulate them for various reasons and motivations.  
The Internet of today is young in comparison with technological advancements 
over the past century (Hill & Marion, 2016).  Hill and Marion (2016) elaborated on the 
evolution of the Internet, being initiated over 50 years ago, with the use of technologies 
developed for the military and research purposes during the Cold War to prevent the 
Soviet Union from continuing their technological lead after being the first to launch a 
satellite into space.  The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) and the 
information processing techniques office had the ability to share information through 




Projects Agency Network (ARPANet) was created (Hill & Marion, 2016).  These 
technological advancements enabled the creation of the Internet in 1990 and created new 
avenues for the criminal world to thrive (Hill & Marion, 2016). 
Although computer crimes were minimal throughout the 1960s through the 1970s, 
due to computer usage being primarily restricted to researchers and the military, hacking 
activities took place, mainly by curious students who wanted to better understand the 
technological environment showcasing their skills to be able to break into something 
designed to be secure (Hill & Marion, 2016).  Hacking offenders oftentimes would sign 
virus intrusions with their names, due to their confidence and the lack of laws for the 
criminalization of these types of activities (Hill & Marion, 2016). 
Hacking activities and the criminalization of hacking has evolved since the 1960s 
and 1970s due to the escalation of computer crimes and the implementation of policies 
and laws in the cyber realm. Hill and Marion (2016) showed how during the 1970s the 
motivations of hackers began changing from an inquisitive nature to more malicious and 
damaging.  Hill and Marion (2016) identified a computer crime in the 1970s, including 
the manipulation of computer data at the Union Dime Savings Bank in 1973 for 
embezzlement. 
The 1970s gave rise to a hacking technique called phreaking, which involved the 
technological skills of hackers to break into phone systems, using tones and the codes 
from the system to gain access to free long-distance phone calls (Hill & Marion, 2016). 
At the Flagler Dog Track in Florida, tickets were altered to produce winning numbers, 




without authorization as a crime (Hill & Marion, 2016).  The Federal Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act was passed in October 1986. More details on this legislative act and how 
criminal hacking has progressed over the last several decades will be in Chapter 2. 
Criminal hacking has greatly contributed to data breaches and cybercrime, in 
general, over the last couple of decades and continues to escalate.  Hampson (2012) 
provided information on how billions of dollars are lost each year due to criminal 
hacking.  The Internet Security Threat Report detailed how cybercrime is growing 
exponentially every year and the loss from data breaches in 2017 consisted of more than 
one billion personal records being compromised, and this is only what has been reported, 
as companies often choose not to report the entirety of their breach (Symantec, 2018). 
Symantec’s (2017) study also indicated that approximately seven billion identities have 
been stolen over the past 8 years, approximately the number of the global population 
today. 
Nash and Thomas (2006) explained that approximately three fourths of the 
experts in the security realm of IT believe that cyber criminals are prevailing due to a 
lack of international laws, law enforcement resources, and lack of overall global 
participation and cooperation in addressing the importance of hacking crime.  Pollaro 
(2010) provided information on how the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act has 
been revised to broaden its scope as a statute from the U.S. Federal Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, that once primarily addressed hacking of government computers but now 
addresses hacking of any computer connected to the Internet. Kain (2013) argued that the 




uniform.  Concerted efforts among international stakeholders are needed to help address 
inconsistencies surrounding criminal hacking policies and deterrence.  
Goodman (2015) explained how societies depend on the technological 
interconnectivities that enhance quality of life, whether through convenience or 
efficiency, but with these continuously advancing technologies comes many 
vulnerabilities.  The growth of technologies coincides with Moore’s law and the effects 
that come with the use (Goodman, 2015).  Moore’s law will be examined in Chapter 2. 
There is a dark world of hidden criminal activities within the universe of borderless 
virtual boundaries and all the intricacies involved (Goodman, 2015).  Holistically 
understanding what is happening in the virtual world, through the help of international 
technical experts, could help in determining what the best course of action would be for 
future policies addressing cyber-criminal activity. 
The Global Forum on Cyber Expertise (2017) interviewed Lynn St. Amour, chair 
of the Internet Governance Forum, which advises the secretary general on the Internet 
Governance Forum meetings.  The Internet Governance Forum, founded in 2005, now 
has approximately 55 interdisciplinary worldwide organization members, including 
public and private sectors, academia, technical organizations, and civic society, who 
collectively deal with Internet governance issues on the global scene. St. Amour 
responded to a question about what the future holds for the Internet over the next decade 
by explaining how the growing Internet of Things (IoT) and technologies using 
blockchain will have an even greater impact on society than the present focus of the 




to the Internet now will increase, moving toward a technologically mobile device 
concentration that is multifaceted, making up the future of the Internet (Global Forum on 
Cyber Expertise, 2017).  This growth will add to the complexities involving technological 
security and the policies crafted in addressing the acts of criminal hacking. 
Burkart and McCourt (2017) identified the security and privacy concerns with 
packaged software being developed and distributed in markets that have minimal 
regulation in the technological realm for the purposes of online surveillance.  The 
European Union addressed, through policy, the protection of personally identifiable 
information in the form of a framework, which regulates marketing of personally 
identifiable information (PII; Burkart & McCourt, 2017).  This type of framework has not 
been implemented in the United States, although these issues may be addressed through 
self-regulation in industry, which could help in the implementation of international 
treaties addressing trade in these markets for curtailing various security and privacy 
concerns, stated Burkart and McCourt (2017).  
Roberts (2013) argued that leaders will need to recruit and teach strategic cyber 
thinkers, so there can be proactive efforts in gathering international support to catch and 
prosecute criminal hacking activities.  Theohary and Rollins (2009) illustrated how many 
issues have challenged the United States, including not knowing for sure where the 
perpetrators committing various cyber-attacks are located.  A lack of federal-private 
sector coordinative efforts in determining potential risks and new increasing threats at the 




disruptions, which suggests the need for enhanced strategies and updated policies 
(Theohary & Rollins, 2009).  
Brown and Poellet (2012) showed how customary international law vastly differs 
from the case law system, making proposals for universal legislation extremely 
challenging.  Trivun, Mahmutćehajić, and Silajdžić (2012) warned that the only way the 
Internet architecture can be properly maintained and secured in this global environment is 
total collective participant in regulation development and implementation.  The results of 
this study can help in coordinating efforts toward the creation and implementation of 
effective policies for criminal hacking, while providing relevant research of the current 
threat landscape of criminal hacking.  
Problem Statement 
The overall receptiveness and acceptance of technological advances over the past 
several decades, from the Internet to the numerous applications used to make everyday 
lives easier, have created a global dilemma.  By readily accepting, and in many cases, 
embracing, these technologies without fully understanding the security risks and 
implications involved, a global threat landscape has developed in the virtual realm, which 
lacks consistent regulations and controls.  The lack of consistent regulations and controls 
throughout various global jurisdictions has contributed to the difficulties in finding the 
true origins of computer intrusions and bringing to justice those responsible under a 





The global community is arguably past due in having consistent established 
policies and legislation that specifically address the penalties and punishments of hacking 
activities in the information technology realm.  Greengard (2012) suggested that nation 
states more lenient in their legislative practices toward the criminal behaviors of hacking 
may be opening up, if not already providing, a haven for hackers.  Nash and Thomas 
(2006) explained that the growing problem of hacking continues to be detrimental to 
societies worldwide, and legislative actions among various nation states have not been 
able to fully address the problem.  Hampson (2012) showed that various acts of hacking 
are responsible for crippling world economies, with losses of billions of dollars every 
year.  
There is a current gap in the literature regarding uniform and consistent standards 
and policies for addressing criminal hacking at the international level.  No clear definition 
for criminal hacking or agreement on punishment for the crime pose a number of 
challenges, negatively affecting the sustainability of evolving technologies.  In this 
quantitative study, I explored individual public and private sector attitudes toward the 
need for one international law for defining criminal hacking and the penalties associated 
with the act and the extent to which the crime should be penalized.  
Purpose of the Study 
Criminal hacking has been taking place for decades.  Billions of dollars have been 
lost due to criminal hacking and the costs continue to escalate.  Security breaches are 
only one aspect of the problem.  The Symantec 2016 Internet Security Threat Report 




2017).  The report also stated an average of 927,000 identities were exposed per breach. 
A security breach involves many elements that harm individuals, businesses, and the 
global economy.  There are multifaceted criminal uses for the information obtained 
through these breaches.  The purpose of this quantitative dissertation was to explore the 
relationship between individuals in the public and private sectors and their attitudes 
toward the need for one international law for defining criminal hacking and the penalties 
associated with the act.  
The criminal world has created an opportunity of cyberspace to accomplish 
exponential gains.  Mitchell (2016) stated that hacking attempts worldwide surpassed one 
billion in 2012 according to a study by the British security firm NCC Group.  The 
complexity of curtailing crimes taking place in a virtual environment without an 
established system for controlling those criminal activities continues to grow.  
Effectively securing networks and technological devices is essential.  Buchanan 
(2016) delineated how the international arena is comprised of computer hacking for 
intelligence gathering through the intrusion of various networks in the public and private 
sectors.  These intrusions can be avenues for attacks capable of manipulating and 
destroying data (Buchanan, 2016).  Buchanan further stated that, through digital forensic 
reporting, it is evident there are intrusions being employed on the national scene for more 
than defensive and training purposes, although not all nation states have the capabilities 
for this.  The sense of urgency among international communities has not been compelling 





Through scholarly research, an examination of the threat landscape, privacy and 
security, and multinational policies and laws provided a foundation for the focus of this 
study.  The relationship among public and private sector individuals and their attitudes 
toward one international law for defining criminal hacking and subsequent punishments 
were explored, which provided insights that could help propel global policy awareness 
toward addressing the virtual threat landscape of criminal hacking.  Additionally, the 
insights gained determined the need for an enhanced approach to address policy and law 
for criminal hacking through increased coordinated efforts with multinational and 
international laws regulating the criminal hacking realm.  In this quantitative study, I 
used an anonymous survey to examine attitudes among public and private sector 
individuals on the need for one international law for defining criminal hacking and the 
degree of penalties for committing the crime.  Statistical tests of the data revealed a 
correlation among some of the variables of the study, which provided some statistical 
significance among the attitudes of the respondents. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The research questions for this quantitative dissertation were designed to gain 
some insight from public and private sector individuals on their attitudes toward the need 
for an international law defining criminal hacking, the penalties associated with the act, 
and the extent to which it should be punished.  The independent variables of the study 
included age group, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical hacking 
ability, and education, which related to the hypotheses by providing, through correlation, 




variables of the study.  The central research question is: Is there a need for the definition 
of criminal hacking and the penalties associated with the act to be addressed under one 
international law? 
RQ1: Do age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical 
hacking ability, and education predict the attitudes toward the need for one international 
law for defining criminal hacking between public and private sector entities? 
H01: Age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical 
hacking ability, and education do not predict the attitudes toward the need for one 
international law for defining criminal hacking between public and private sector 
individuals? 
H11: Age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical 
hacking ability, and education do predict the attitudes toward the need for one 
international law for defining criminal hacking between public and private sector 
individuals? 
RQ2: Do age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical 
hacking ability, and education predict the attitudes toward the need for the penalties of 
criminal hacking to be addressed under one international law between public and private 
sector individuals? 
H02: Age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical 
hacking ability, and education do not predict the attitudes toward the need for the 
penalties of criminal hacking to be addressed under one international law between 




H12: Age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical 
hacking ability, and education do predict the attitudes toward the need for the 
penalties of criminal hacking to be addressed under one international law between 
public and private sector individuals? 
RQ3: Is there a difference among age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure 
sector affiliation, technical hacking ability, and education on the attitudes toward the 
extent criminal hacking, as defined from the example in the study, needs modification of 
stricter or lesser penalties between public and private sector individuals? 
H03: There is no difference among age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure 
sector affiliation, technical hacking ability, and education on the attitudes toward 
the extent criminal hacking, as defined from the examples in the study, needs 
modification of stricter or lesser penalties between public and private sector 
individuals? 
H13: There is a difference among age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure 
sector affiliation, technical hacking ability, and education on the attitudes toward 
the extent criminal hacking, as defined from the examples in the study, needs 
modification of stricter or lesser penalties between public and private sector 
individuals? 
Theoretical Foundation 
The threat landscape of criminal hacking played a significant role in the security 
of networks and technologically connected devices and the security of individuals and 




all connected technologies, provided a foundation for the need to develop and implement 
universal standards for the punishments of criminal hacking using the frameworks of role 
theory and empathy in political theory. 
Trivun et al. (2012) pointed out that regulation encompassing the architecture of 
the Internet cannot be determined by individual entities, but rather it must involve 
authorities at all levels, relying on economic and political entities at the local, national, 
and international level.  Trivun et al. (2012) showed how the Internet acts as an 
international framework that could unite various regions of the world to work together in 
harmony, while addressing various security issues present.  This framework, according to 
Trivum et al. (2012), is comprised of entities at the lowest levels in government and those 
at the highest levels and cannot be separated from traditional laws and theories of law 
that have governed communities before the advent of the Internet.  
Menon and Siew (2012) showed how a unified multilateral effort is needed to 
address cybersecurity issues, which play a significant role in the future and security of the 
global economy.  Newman and Thakur (2006) illustrated how global societies are 
vulnerable to many of the same problems that each entity faces separately in relation to a 
number of global issues.  There is more efficiency in multiple coordinative efforts for the 
common good of the world rather than unilateral or stand-alone efforts, even with the 
limitations that come with the holistic approach (Newman & Thakur, 2006).  A closer 
look at these efforts offers insight into where policy initiatives are underway in 




relations provides an aggregate illustration in relation to these different political cultures 
in Chapter 2.  
Role theory, as demonstrated by Thies (2009), served as an umbrella theoretical 
framework for this study in the context of international governing entities.  Given that the 
nation-state system is understood through the lens of international relations, role theory 
helped contextualize how hacking has been approached at the international level.  This 
theory, projected through an exploratory lens, helped explain the role of foreign policy 
and its connections to public administrators (Below, 2014).  The use of role theory in this 
study provided a model for positive social change toward international coordination 
efforts in addressing policy issues surrounding criminal hacking for clearly defining the 
act of criminal hacking and the punishment standards for the act.  
An examination of empathy in political theory, as posited by Edge (2016), 
showed how empathy is a key component missing in the political landscape today, and it 
may offer some hope in addressing future international initiatives.  The phenomena that 
provided a foundation for the study encompassed pieces of a conceptual puzzle, which 
included the security of everything technologically connected and the privacy and 
security of everybody in the virtual realm and policies and laws in relation to the 
cybercriminal threat landscape of criminal hacking.  From these concepts, relative 
proposition statements showed how the puzzle pieces, figuratively speaking, are 
connected and related through the theoretical veins of role theory and empathy in 





In this study, I explored criminal hacking through a framework that used the 
current threat landscape in the virtual realm as a magnifier for determining if there is a 
need for an international law defining criminal hacking and the penalties associated with 
the act.  Logical connections for this study have been illustrated through the threat 
landscape of criminal hacking, which includes categories and methodologies. Security 
and privacy issues have been connected in relation to criminal hacking, furnishing 
evidence that addresses the deficiencies of multinational policies and laws for the 
punishments of criminal hacking.  This framework provided significance to the problem 
at hand while offering key concepts that work in conjunction with the theories used, 
which supply insight for the questions of the study.  The connections are analyzed and 
covered in Chapter 2. 
Nature of the Study 
A quantitative approach was used for the study.  Qualitative studies can be more 
complex in the interpretive arena and rely on statistical analysis and testing methods.  In 
this research, I took a pragmatic approach, using breadth to add to the validity and 
strength of the study.  The scope of the study incorporated quantitative methods for 
empirically focusing on descriptive statistics to evaluate audience segmentation and 
opinions for the hypotheses tested in attempts to garner information universally.  The 
study combined empirical and theoretical aspects, which provided a comprehensive 
picture of the phenomena, while the questions of the study established predictions and 




 It is important to understand basic meanings of the foundational verbiage used 
throughout this dissertation. A few explanations involving the threat landscape, criminal 
hacking, and personally identifiable information are given to clarify these concepts and 
phrases, for the purpose of this study.  The following provides definitions for these key 
terms.   
Definitions 
Threat landscape: For the purpose of this study, the concept of the threat 
landscape refers to the acts of criminal hacking and the methodologies used.  
Criminal hacking: Unlawful hacking, according to the laws put in place in any 
particular jurisdiction.  
Personally identifiable information (PII): Any type of information that identifies 
or can help to identify an individual.  The U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
Privacy Office (2002) distinguishes between PII and sensitive PII. The European Union 
differentiates PII data as being personal data or sensitive data (General Data Protection 
Regulation, Art. 4).  
Assumptions 
The quantitative paradigm assumptions include questions that should be answered 
ontologically, epistemologically, axiologically, rhetorically, and methodologically 
(Creswell, 1994).  The ontological assumption addresses the question of reality, which is 
objectively examined.  The epistemological assumption provides a distinction that a 
researcher will be independent from the research.  The axiological, or role, assumption 




the rhetorical assumption, shows a formal and quantitatively impersonal stance.  The 
methodological assumption includes the research encompassed a deductive process 
through generalizations, validity, and reliability.  
The following assumptions are noted for the study: First, most technologies are 
vulnerable to criminal hacking.  Second, a security awareness culture will help alleviate 
some of the vulnerabilities encountered from criminal hacking activities through the 
implementation of best practice standard protocols in securing technologies.  These 
assumptions were necessary and provided the reader with general assumptions 
recognized by many cybersecurity professionals and interdisciplinary and 
multidisciplinary practitioners. 
Scope and Delimitations 
The scope of the study is limited to the defined acts of criminal hacking and the 
laws for the penalties associated with the crime.  Cybercrime encompasses a vast array of 
elements that would fall outside of the realm of criminal hacking, including cyber 
bullying, child solicitation, identity theft, and cyberstalking; elements of criminal hacking 
do come into play with all these crimes.  Wilsem (2013) illustrated, how crimes that are 
computer-focused, “…such as virus, malware or botnet infection, and hacking (as cited 
from Furnell, 2002, p. 22),” solely depend on the technological realm, whereas computer-
assisted crimes consist of crimes that took place before the inception of the Internet but 
use technologies to commit crimes today.  In this research study, I focused on the acts of 
criminal hacking, the methodologies used, targets of the crime, and legislative efforts and 




The populations for the study included interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary 
individuals involved with the technological arena of cybersecurity in the public or private 
sectors, cyber legislation realm, law enforcement, or academia.  This study excluded the 
general population due to scope and limitations; future studies could gain a broader 
insight by conducting a study of the general population from a multinational population.  
I chose this focus because societies are past due in clearly defining and addressing the 
penalties for the criminal acts of hacking in the virtual realm.  Insights gained from this 
study may help propel future studies in the policy realm by generating additional 
knowledge to better understand attitudes among the public and private sector on the need 
for international laws for criminal hacking. 
In regard to generalizability, Barnes et al. (2012) showed how predictions for the 
findings of a quantitative study cannot serve as being precise due to the sample size, the 
interpretations of the sample in relation to the understanding of the questions being asked 
of the population, and the baseline of the predictability and assumptions to similar or past 
occurrences in the field of study.  Barnes et al. (2012) explained how researchers should 
consider using a precise external measurement process that consists of three categories of 
generalizability, which include treatment measurement and subjects to add to the 
reliability of the study; however, doing so does not guarantee similar results will be 






The motivations of all criminal hacking incidents cannot be clearly defined, which 
makes it challenging to address the penalties needed for various acts of criminal hacking. 
According to the definition of the laws in place in different areas of the world, it remains 
unclear if all criminal hackers possess a mindset for committing a criminal activity.  It is 
also unknown what part culture plays in various areas of the world toward the mindset of 
committing criminal hacking.  This study is based on information available to the public, 
which alleviates classified information in the global arena.  Policy information is also 
limited to nation states that are open with their policies.  Criminal hacking activities and 
those that have been compromised are limited to what has been reported.  
Available scholarly research has been examined to help provide a model in 
delineating some of the motivations behind criminal hacking to contribute to the elements 
needed for formulating a consistent standard policy for the punishments of criminal 
hacking globally.  Global policy initiatives may benefit from research that expounds on 
the consistencies and inconsistencies in punishments of criminal hacking on a 
multinational level, offering some insight into issues surrounding the challenges and 
intricacies of developing standard policies in the virtual realm.  Some implications of the 
study offered the opportunity for positive social change in the realm of policy and 
legislation, which can be drawn from the possibility of future studies in building on and 
adding to this study in the realm of conviction rates for criminal hacking and the 




Significance of the Study 
Global societies have been working on how to deal with the creation and 
implementation of effective policies in relation to cybercriminal activities that have been 
escalating for decades.  By peering through the lens of the threat landscape of criminal 
hacking, security, privacy, policies, and laws, the connected concepts have been 
examined to provide an epistemological overview of the ontology of criminal hacking. 
These taxonomies have shown how each provides connecting threads toward building 
effective solutions for mitigating the problems associated with criminal hacking. 
There is a critical need to address the issues of criminal hacking at all 
governmental levels and at the international level, so that no individuals or groups have 
immunity from prosecution and conviction for criminal hacking activities (Greengard, 
2012).  This study contributes to the body of knowledge needed to address the problem 
through an examination on the attitudes of public and private sector individuals toward 
the need for clearly defining criminal hacking and the extent punishments should be 
associated with the acts.  
Hacking activities have accelerated with the use of hardware and software 
technologies and the intricacies of the Internet and its connected networks, and the global 
costs escalate.  Hathaway (2014) evaluated the implications for regulating various aspects 
of the Internet, and many existing policy challenges are deep-rooted within the foreign 
policy realm.  This study’s positive social change implications include the identification 
of optimal legislative strategies and best-case practices in enforcement that bring the 




study serves as a guide to parallel legislation at the level of the nation state and may 
eventually support international treaties that establish uniform standards and a global 
regime to combat criminal hacking. 
Implications for Positive Social Change 
There is hope this study will motivate researchers to continue with similar studies 
in addressing the issues surrounding the new era of technological growth and the 
implications it has on global societies in efforts to help promote potential solutions in 
combating criminal acts in the ICT realm.  By understanding the threat landscape in the 
virtual realm and the negative consequences of various hacking crimes, coordinative 
efforts among public and private sector entities have provided additional insights for 
legislative bodies worldwide to band together and move forward in clearly defining and 
regulating the criminal acts of hacking.  
Summary 
In this study, I looked at how role theory plays an integral part in addressing the 
fundamental problems of technological compromise, while providing a foundation for 
analyzing the current threat landscape of criminal hacking, and determining if there is a 
need for an international law for defining criminal hacking and the penalties associated 
with the crime.  The quantitative empirical study approach consisted of descriptive and 
inferential statistical research, offering elements of audience segmentation and the ability 
to quantify the perceptions, attitudes, and opinions of the sampling units, while 
generalizing the relationships between the independent and dependent variables of the 




political legislative realm.  The security of global societies depends on swiftly addressing 
the problems that encompass our technological realm.  In Chapter 2, the connecting 
elements of the criminal hacking threat landscape, the security of networks and connected 
devices, privacy internationally, and the multinational efforts in creating and 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
Modern societies are experiencing exponential technological growth and with that 
comes uncertainty for the threat landscape of vulnerabilities and privacy and security 
concerns.  The purpose of this study was to provide insight on attitudes toward a holistic 
approach in addressing the threat landscape of criminal hacking through international 
laws clearly defining criminal hacking, policies associated with criminal hacking, and 
penalties for the crime.  Given the virtual landscape has no given boundaries, various 
international entities have come together to propose solutions for addressing the problem, 
but no general consensus has been reached on how to proceed forward in defining and 
addressing acts of criminal hacking and determining whether a need exists for a global 
standard for policies and penalties associated with the crimes. 
In Chapter 2, the following topics are discussed: a literature search strategy, a 
theoretical foundation for the study, a literature review tying in key variables and 
elements of the study, and a concluding summary of the fundamental paradigm of the 
policy dilemma.  A strategic approach was taken to exhaustively search the literature to 
gain a holistic international insight to address the questions of the study, and the gap in 
the literature was examined for the problem of the study.  
Literature Search Strategy 
The Walden University databases were accessed using various search engines in 
relation to the study, including Political Science Complete, Criminal Justice Database, 




and Government Collection, Homeland Security Digital Library, Science Direct, and 
Thoreau Multiple Database Search. Key search terms, with the utilization of various 
search combinations, were regulation, law, policy, legislation, universal legislation, 
hacking, computer intrusion, ethical hacking, computer crime, cybercrime, cyber security 
and cybersecurity, role theory, deterrence theory, punishment, public policy, 
international legislation, foreign policy, international relations and cybersecurity law. 
I performed an initial search of the connecting elements of the study to ensure 
foundational works within the scope of the study were available.  Most of the research for 
this study consisted of peer-reviewed journal articles, books, and conference proceedings 
covering the last 5 years; some research is provided from earlier writings of subject 
matter experts.  The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) is known for 
setting standards in the electronics and computer industries.  IEEE provided documents 
on conference proceedings in relation to the study.  
Theoretical Foundation 
With a global environment that is virtually connected, addressing policy solutions 
in the virtual realm will need the perspectives from multiple stakeholders.   Trivun et al. 
(2012) pointed out that regulation in relation to the Internet and modern-day technologies 
should be approached from a holistic stance, including all political entities from local, 
national, and international levels, to be able to fully address the intricacies involved.  This 
multinational, multidisciplinary approach could unite various regions of the world to 
work together while addressing the threat landscape of the virtual realm.  A body of 




of addressing role theory in connection with the roles played in leadership.  These leaders 
should enact those roles with expedient action and empathy, serving as an influencing 
stimulus for all entities to model in the virtual realm. 
Role Theory and Empathy 
Role theory provided a theoretical foundation for this study with the consideration 
of empathy.  Thies (2009) showed the need for international communities to take the role 
of working together to address policies through international relations, while Edge (2016) 
showed how empathy is missing in the political environment of policy development. 
Within the role theory construct is an illustration of applying an empathetic model 
approach for addressing policy standards for the international community in the realm of 
criminal hacking (Edge, 2016).  Empathy can furnish a missing piece in international 
policy strategies by embracing a genuine concern for the welfare of all entities involved 
in the policy development process.  
Looking through the lens of empathy while fulfilling a political obligation to work 
in concert with international bodies may propel a holistic consideration for examining the 
reasons and motivations of criminal hacking and potential solutions for addressing the 
problem other than potential incarceration as a deterrence method.  A multidisciplinary 
approach, including the involvement of subject matter experts in relation to the many 
elements involved, for considering a holistic international framework that provides 
consistency and resiliency as the standard for all environments encompassing the virtual 
realm (Trivum et al., 2012).  Efforts should include a holistic approach of addressing the 




technologically connected devices, global awareness strategies for further addressing the 
privacy and security of our global citizens (Menon and Siew, 2012).  
Bonner (2016) illustrated how the role of actions in role theory depends on the 
actor, with expectations coming into play as to what actions should be taken. 
Controversial outlooks of the past, according to Arendt’s evaluation of what the action 
role has in role theory, showed how role theorists looked objectively, rather than taking 
an ethical approach, to political circumstances of action, which can be seen from the 
atrocious acts committed throughout the centuries by those with political power playing 
no empathetic role to achieve their agenda (Bonner, 2016).  Today role theory can be 
seen as a theoretical approach to applying expected actions to the roles given in 
leadership, where it is expected that those with decision-making powers will fulfill their 
roles in efforts to protect the population (Wehner & Thies, 2014).  In this study, role 
theory will provide a model for positive social change toward international efforts in 
addressing policy standards and laws for criminal hacking.  
The link to empathy in role theory provided an approach for examining future 
international policy and law development through multinational coordinative efforts in 
relation to the attitudes of multidisciplinary entities.  This study consisted of a holistic 
approach in tying the pieces of the current threat landscape of criminal hacking with the 
elements of privacy and security and the attitudes toward an international approach in 
establishing international laws for clearly defining criminal hacking and the policies and 
penalties associated with the crime.  The holistic framework provided significance for 




foundations of role theory and empathy serve as a foundation for the questions of the 
study on whether a need exists for one international law defining criminal hacking and 
the punishments associated with the act.  
Moore’s Law 
Moore’s law provides implications and relevance to the problem of this study by 
addressing the speed at which technologies evolve.  Goodman (2015) showed how 
Moore’s law, which shows technological growth doubling every 2 years in relation to 
computer processing chip components, has continued the predicted path over the years, 
although DeBenedictis (2017) delineated, citing Moore (1965), how Moore’s original 
1965 article is broad in scope and there are modern-day inconsistencies. Nonetheless, 
Moore’s law should continue to be recognized as a positive factor for the computational 
growth in the technological realm moving forward.  
Over the past 50 years there has been an evolution, in relation to the technological 
growth of semiconductors and computers, described DeBenedictis (2017), enabling for 
our technologies to surpass the original concept of Moore’s law, to include newer 
technological developments that fall outside of the original scope of Moore’s law, such as 
with 3-D manufacturing and neuromorphic circuits, quantum qubits, and newer 
computing memory techniques.  Denning and Lewis (2017) stated how technology in 
relation to components, speed, and technological modernizations are normally applied to 
Moore’s law, although the only one aspect that truly is a part of the original concept of 
Moore’s law is the component element.  The evaluations of Moore’s law show that we 




environments as to the eventual consequences that could befall the global environment, 
given the magnitude of the scope provided, and the future evaluations of the morphism 
and adaptation of technological environments, as depicted by DeBenedictis (2017). 
Technologies are evolving in ways that are difficult to predict.  Cusumano and 
Yoffie (2016) explored elements for moving forward in addressing newer technologies, 
in that Moore’s law was a foundational impetus for major companies, such as Intel, 
Microsoft, and Apple, which provided a forecast that has held true over the years.  What 
will the future hold after Moore’s law, questioned Cusumano and Yoffie (2016), in 
relation to our assumptions of hardware, software, and digital advancements?  These 
questions are fundamental and should be examined and answered using a 
multidisciplinary approach, including a wide array of participation among public and 
private sector subject matter experts and leaders (Cusumano & Yoffie, 2016).  
Literature Review 
We are entering an era of machine learning and virtual and augmented realities, 
which provides even further implications for policy development in the realm of privacy 
and security.  Proactive international policy development, in the realm of virtual 
technologies, and a continuous multidisciplinary approach for immediately addressing 
security issues along the way will help provide some continuity for helping to protect our 
global societies from the technological threat landscape that has proliferated, practically 
unnoticed, over the past several decades.  The following concepts, consisting of the threat 
landscape of cybercrime in relation to criminal hacking, privacy and security issues in 




have been examined with an overview of the hacking environment.  All the elements of 
the study connect in various ways, as can be seen in the subsequent passages.  
Threat Landscape 
It was stated at the 2016 European Intelligence and Security Informatics 
Conference, as cited in (Choo, 2008; Kshetri, 2010; Wall and Williams, 2013 &Yip, 
Webber, Shadbolt, 2013), “Security and intelligence agencies in the UK, the USA and 
Australia consider cybercrime one of the most critical threats today, putting it on the 
same level as global terrorism (Mikhaylov & Frank, 2016, p.80).”  The cyber threat 
landscape continues to evolve with the growth of emerging technologies and the vast 
speed at which these technologies work. 
When did the first discussions of cyber policies first take place?  Warner (2012) 
clarified how the history of cybersecurity may be surprising to some in that the concern 
for securing our data and technologies started long before most had the opportunity of 
learning what security was about in the technology realm.  Although there is not research 
depicting exactly when cyber policies were first contemplated by government officials, it 
was recognized at the government level, starting in the 1960’s, four threats involving our 
technological advancements, which would eventually influence future policy in the cyber 
realm (Warner, 2012).  
As early as the 1960s, explained Warner (2012), it was known, through the 
declassification of government documents, that sensitive data on computers could be 
leaked by computers and should be protected, as well it was realized in the 1970s that 




able to house computer attacks in the 1980s through the 1990s and the realization that if 
we could accomplish computer attacks, then other countries may possess the same 
abilities (Warner, 2012).  Warner (2012) continued, by showing statements made by 
Willis H. Ware, in 1967, at the Spring Joint Computer Conference on the ‘Security and 
Privacy in Computer Systems’ that vulnerabilities to computer systems included humans, 
hardware, software, and the organization of the system, all of which can contribute to the 
consequences of an intrusion, which makes whatever is housed on the system available to 
the intruder.  It was also shown from the conference proceedings that looking to what 
could be achieved through vulnerabilities should also be considered (Warner, 2012). 
The following report identified the need for addressing the problems we are 
dealing with today, with the vastness of the environment to be addressed.  Warner (2012) 
showed how it was understood by officials in the 1970s, through a classified report from 
the RAND corporation, that there could be no security, through engineering, that would 
be able to protect the technologies of the day and any type of sensitive data should not be 
stored in the technological environment without excepting a profound risk of discovery, 
as cited in the (Report of the Defense Science Board Task force on Computer Security, 
Security Controls for Computer Systems, Ware Report, Feb.11, 1970, published by the 
Office of the Director of Defense Research).  One can only imagine what our cyber realm 
would be like today if proactive security and policy measures were headed with 
expedited actions among our international communities from the onset.  
History can offer many insights for present-day cybersecurity issues.  The human 




of the world, as it is known today, continues to hold true, stated Williams (2015), in that 
crimes of the past are crimes of the present, although committed using different 
methodologies or approaches.  A look at history showed how in 1944 the Office of 
Strategic Services, put out a field manual entitled Simple Sabotage Field Manual, which 
detailed the motivating factors for recruiting citizens for the cause during World War II, 
including the personal benefits and sense of value and belonging (Williams, 2015).  This 
historic insight furnishes a framework that could help in discovering the motivating 
factors behind the hacking mentality and whether these factors contribute to the criminal 
acts of hacking. 
Industrial espionage is a very big problem equating to approximately $300 billion 
a year and growing, especially for international travelers and the loss of intellectual 
property in international hotel rooms (Benice, 2012).  Methods such as covert room 
intrusions, which include physical entry to gain valuables, computer data copies, and 
accessing items in the room safe are typical ways that are used to gain intellectual 
property covertly and can provide information for potential blackmail (Benice, 2012). 
Room stacking, which uses corner rooms to place wiring on the exterior of each level, so 
it is not easily detected, provides for an additional method that is used to spy on 
international travelers in gaining proprietary information (Benice, 2012; Richmond, 
Morrison, & Covarrubias, 2017).  These are only a few examples of what is taking place 
on the international scene in relation to industrial espionage but can also be evaluated in 




A recent study provided by the RAND Corporation showed how the 
cybercriminal markets are on the rise and can be more profitable than the drug trade, 
given the ease in which hacking tools can be obtained and the ability to use private 
anonymous networks, such as the dark net, for recruiting and business dealings (Ablon & 
Libicki, 2015).  Virtual tools and the Internet’s encryption provided a way for terrorist 
organizations to spread malware without being detected, further assisting them in 
accomplishing their ideological agendas (Gewirtz, 2016).  Emergency communications 
are now vulnerable to being compromised by terrorists and hackers who aim to disrupt 
the system for gaining an advantage for their political or ideological goals, which holds 
several implications for security professionals in the quest to secure critical environments 
in the cases of emergency situations (Gewirtz, 2013).  
Castelluccio (2017) elaborated on some of the infamous hacks during 2016, 
including smart home devices, bitcoin losing over $75 million, and a digital bank robbery 
taking approximately $81 million dollars of Bangladesh’s money from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, showing how profitable hacking attacks can be.  The 
interconnectivity of our technological devices provided the opportunities for intrusions, 
especially through Wireless.  It has been shown that children’s toys are vulnerable to 
hacking, this was discovered when the kid connect services, through the Learning Lodge, 
was compromised and millions of data records were taken, including over 6 million 
records of children and a whole year of chatting communication records (Wide Range of 




risks of hacking, as shown from a study conducted on early E-learning systems (Mihai, 
Pruna, & Petrica, 2017).  
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), stated Juliadotter Hacking smart parking 
meters (2016) from a study on how smart parking meters can be hacked, proved to be a 
virtual avenue vulnerable to intrusions and the methodologies and motivations behind 
these types of hacks can vary.  The study found the impacts of a hack could include data 
compromise, the disruption of service, and false data produced by manipulating the 
network packets that could have many consequences in the disruption of service 
(Hacking Smart Parking Meters, 2016).  It was found in categorizing the attack of a 
smart meter that the threat agents encompass motivations in the form of gaining data for 
nefarious purposes, for political purposes, or for not wanting to pay for parking a vehicle 
(Hacking Smart Parking Meters, 2016). 
Autonomous vehicles have been developed and are being tested on roads today in 
the United States, which provides questions to the safety of the technologies being used. 
Jafarnejad et al. (2015) illustrated how there are security issues with connected vehicles 
through a car hacking experiment with the best of the best technologies imbedded into 
modern-day vehicles.  The challenge concluded with many vulnerabilities that included 
the hacker being able to manipulate the car in moving forwards or backwards, 
manipulations with lowering the speed, and manipulating and changing data on the 
dashboard, to name a few (Jafarbehad et al., 2015).  These penetration tests showed that a 
vehicle can be criminally hacked, providing for potentially serious security and safety 




A prototype quantum communications satellite, with a nickname of Micius, 
explained Castelluccio (2016), designed to make communications extremely secure 
through cryptology, was sent out by China in August of 2016.  This showed how the 
technological virtual realm is vulnerable in space and there is a need for extra security, 
although this extra security could also provide a way for paths to be covered and not to be 
traceable or detectable when examining virtual crimes, due to the cryptographic elements, 
if this type of quantum technology is embraced by the criminal realm in the future.  It has 
been discovered that a 3-D printer hooked up to the Internet provided an avenue for 
hacking to manipulate with the printer itself or specifically causing various defects to be 
present within the created model (3D Printing is Vulnerable to Hackers, 2016).  
There are technological security breaches every day, explained Mansfield-Devine 
(2014), and the hacking incidents today are not on a small scale, they are industrial in 
scale to what has taken place in previous years.  Banks are a major target for criminal 
hackers, due to the amount of money that can be exfiltrated (Mansfield-Devine, 2014).  
Not only do criminal hacking incidents aim to target organizations for financial reasons, 
hackers are joining forces to form what is termed a hacker collective, for purposes of 
nation state hacking for any given purpose or agenda, including espionage, terrorism, and 
electronic surveillance (Banks, 2017; Gerwirtz, 2011; Van DerWalt, 2017). 
As-a-service, referring to hacking that is outsourced, stated Ablon and Liciki 
(2015), has grown substantially over the years and can be very profitable.  An infamous 
Russian hacker, Peter Levashov, charged $500 for his services in sending phishing 




thousands of computers, that could be controlled remotely ($500, 2017).  Peter Levashov 
was arrested in Spain on April 14, 2017 and the Kelihos network, of approximately 
100,000 malware infected private computers, and was taken down ($500, 2017).  
Hacktivism is gaining momentum in our modern-day culture due to the 
transparency and availability of data that can be used to target groups or individuals 
(Gewirtz, 2011; Wood, 2015).  The tools are readily available for these attacks, as well as 
any other types of hacking attacks (Juliadotter, 2016).  Gewirtz (2015) illustrated how 
social media sites, including career related sites, are being used as an entry way into 
virtual attacks, especially those dealing with critical infrastructure for any given political 
cause.  Illegal hacker activity in the cyber realm includes the Syrian civil war and the 
Syrian Electronic Army (SEA), stated Mansfield-Devine (2014), where denial of service 
attacks and social media account hijacking is common through the hacktivism mindset. 
Since 2011, the private sector security organization, FireEye, showed how the Syrian 
Malware Team initiates attacks through Remote Access Trojans (RAT), which aims to 
take data in espionage attempts, having far more consequences than the activities of the 
SEA. 
Online social networks have proven to be a huge vector for online criminal 
activity in the realm of black hat hackers and their recruitment of followers, as well as 
with terrorist organizations and the recruitment of individuals for their cause (Al-khateeb, 
Conlan, Agarwal1, Baggili, & Breitinger, 2016).  Al-khateeb et al. (2016) continued to 
show how these social media networks, vulnerable to criminal hacker networks and 




networks.  Tracing of communications for the recruitment activities of these groups has 
proven to be very difficult to ascertain through the digital forensic methods and tools 
used by many today, due to the amount of big data elements involved within the online 
social networks (Al-khateeb et al., 2016). 
Criminal hacking, in its various forms, is a global problem and continues to be a 
major part of the cyber threat landscape.  Burkart and McCourt (2017) detailed how 
software packages designed to target individuals and various entities, for gaining all types 
of information, is being purchased on a global scale within the confounds of the law, 
since there is little regulatory deterrence outside of the regulatory frameworks put in 
place for intellectual property rights.  This growing phenomenon of cybersecurity 
software, developed for addressing the need for offensive and defensive cybersecurity 
methods in securing our networks and technologies, provides tools that can be used for 
nefarious purposes, and has given rise to a political international economy of vendors and 
clients capable of providing many types of surveillances (Burkhart & McCourt, 2017). 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) have accelerated to the 
point today were the technologies are being used to increase productivity and efficiency 
on a number of legal fronts. On the other hand, Solomon (2020) illustrated how AI and 
ML are being used as tools to help hackers in advancing their agenda’s for finding 
vulnerabilities in systems and for creating high quality phishing campaigns in their 
attempts to targeting influential individuals.  The use of AI in the wrong hands is one of 






The terminology of hacking has been around for decades, depicting activities that 
can be ethical or criminal.  The methods used for hacking commonly consist of using 
readily available tools or programs for penetrating technological devices.  One form of 
hacking is ethical hacking, which is used by many organizations and businesses in the 
public and private sectors in testing for security vulnerabilities.  Ethical hacking is 
gaining in popularity all over the world in academia and for red and blue team 
competitions, where a secured environment is used to test security vulnerabilities and for 
gaining experience in the penetration testing environment.  Hacking tools are readily 
available, as well as hacking techniques are provided on the Internet through YouTube 
videos and various forums, as well as through academic books and journals. 
The acts of criminal hacking can be difficult to define, in that practically any type 
of cybercrime could include the criminal acts of computer intrusion.  Rashkovski, 
Naumovskil, and Naumovskil (2016) expounded on the elements that define hacking, as 
cited from (McQuade 2006;Taylor 1999), “… The standard broad definition of hacking 
encompasses all forms of using technology for purposes for which that technology is not 
intended” (Rashkovski et al., 2016, p.138).  There are not universally accepted definitions 
for the acts of criminal hacking, as posited by the cybersecurity community and law 
enforcement officials, although definitions are put forth in some of the legislations 
internationally, all with some intricate variances.  Rashkoski et al. (2016) continued, as 
cited by (McQuade 2006), “illegally gaining access to one or more computer systems by 




passwords and firewalls in order to use or steal data or to insert new (external) program 
functions” (Rashkoski et al., 2016, p. 139).  “Under the CFAA, unauthorized access to a 
protected computer is punishable by a fine or by imprisonment” (Schultze, 2016, p.245). 
Lipoff (Hacking the house, 2016, Ch. 1) illustrated how approximately 45 years 
ago, in the 70’s when hacking involved telephone networks, he hacked the doorbell to his 
apartment to allow for his newspaper to be delivered through the locked lobby doors at 
the timing he specified, enabling for his newspaper to be delivered to his apartment door. 
Since then he has enhanced his methodologies for hacking his house, providing for 
technological conveniences for controlling various intricacies between the two homes he 
owns, which are separated by a five-hour airplane flight, seemingly being present at 
either location at the same time, due to cameras, lighting, and other technological 
illusions and manipulations (Hacking the house, 2016, Ch. 2-3). 
Numerous computer intrusion tools have been developed over the last couple of 
decades and are commonly used to accomplish the tasks of criminal hacking.  Juliadottter 
(2016) explained how the threat vectors, or the tools in this case, help in capturing Wi-Fi 
traffic, enabling for the intrusion into a smart parking meter.  A couple of the tools used 
for this attack, other than a laptop with a wireless antenna, are aircrack-ng suite and 
wireshark, which can be used for the entire process (Juliadotter, 2016).  These tools are 
readily available to acquire and are not only used by those committing computer crimes, 
but they are also used by public and private sector entities for security purposes and in 




Bradbury (2011) detailed a step by step methodology for cracking a network by 
scanning the environment to find vulnerabilities using various methods and penetration 
testing tools.  Gold (2012) described how hacking can be done with a cell phone just as 
easy, if not more so, than with a laptop due to the advancements of software applications. 
Wireless computer intrusions can be accomplished in any given public area without being 
easily detected.  These computer intrusion mobile apps can be used for ethical and 
criminal hacking purposes (Gold, 2012). 
An empirical study, conducted by Bento and Bento (2014), consisted of 60 
months of statistical data, on a hacking model, displayed various activities encompassing 
attacks through hacking.  The model represented the following steps or variables, 
(reconnaissance, malicious code, user compromise, root compromise, and denial of 
service), as well as “two other variables that might have an impact on the growth of in 
security breaches: number of hosts in the Internet, and broadband access to the Internet 
by home and small business users” (Bento & Bento, 2014, p. 681).  
The study found; “Reconnaissance (Step 1) is positively related to Malicious 
Code (the preferred route to achieve initial access in Step 2), supporting the model’s 
prediction that increased efforts to find vulnerable systems are associated with increased 
attempts to break into them” (Bento & Bento, 2014, p 687).  The study also found 
“Success in achieving User Compromise in Step 2 is positively related to Root 
Compromise (Step 3), which is compatible with hackers’ attempts toward escalation of 
privilege.” (Bento & Bento, 2014, p. 687) The final findings showed “…a negative 




hacker’s frustration at failing to gain control of a resource may be associated with trying 
to sabotage it through DoS attacks” (Bento & Bento, 2014, 268). 
Hacking, as noted by many, is an inquisitive quest.  If hacking is examined from a 
democracy viewpoint of having the ability to learn and become the best an individual can 
be in a free environment, it can be seen how those interested in the technological 
interworking’s of the technological landscape may have great motivational aptitude to 
explore the intricacies of the field to personally excel in the quest for new knowledge, 
while gaining a sense of power (Hunsinger & Schrock, 2016).  Soderberg and Delfanti 
(2015) extrapolated “…technical innovations spawned by hackers (modular software 
code, mesh computer networks, distributed retrieval systems, private cryptography, etc.) 
constitute the material infrastructure of today’s capitalism” (p.795).  
Human curiosity traits are a part of human nature.  As cited in (Oudshoorn & 
Pinch 2005), “Hacking can be seen as a special case of a broader trend of citizen 
engagement with science and user appropriation of technology” (Söderberg & Delfanti, 
2015, p.794).  There were no policies in place to discourage or deter the activities of 
learning the intricacies of technology through hacking back when virtual hardware and 
software were first developed.  When and where did the landscape change to that of those 
being on a quest to gain knowledge to that of exploiting technologies for personal gain, at 
the expense of anybody or anything that might be in the way? 
Denning (1983), a contributor to the Association for Computing Machinery 
(AMC), posed questions, approximately 35 years ago, dealing with morality and clarity 




to answer back then, stated Denning (1983), and the question is still trying to be 
answered today, with all of the intertwining intricacies.  More than 60 businesses were 
reportedly broken into by a Milwaukee hacking club called “414 hackers”, which one 
member was indicted for breaching the computers that held PII of cancer patients at 
Sloan-Kettering (Denning, 1983).  Denning (1983) analogized how computer intrusions, 
like physical home invasions, physically accessing office filing cabinets, or somebody 
stealing your automobile without your permission or knowledge.  
Societies are dealing with the same issues today, but on a significantly larger 
scale.  It is hard to say how the hacking community has grown and proliferated 
throughout the years.  Computer intrusions have gained in notoriety, “2014 was the year 
the hack went viral” (Ablon & Libicki, 2015, p. 143).  How many hackers and/or groups 
exist today among international communities?  Is it possible to change a culture that has 
evolved into what encompasses some aspects of all cultures today?  The questions of the 
study aimed to provide insight, as to what is perceived by stakeholders in today’s 
cybersecurity realm, for the way in which we should proceed forward in the legislative 
realm (Tang, Bagchi, & Jain, 2009). 
Hacking in relation to privacy in the digital era has become a concern for many.  
Interestingly, a reporter for the Surfacing column (Hiltner, 2018), showed how some 
anonymity and privacy perceptions are moving in a different direction in the hacking 
realm from what was once considered to be the norm of only using aliases, which can be 
seen through interactions from hacker conferences, such as the annual hacking 




involving demands by the private and public sectors for experts in the cybersecurity field 
and bug bounty programs, propelled by professional entities and the gamification arena, 
have shown a present day need for various aspects of the hacking culture (Hiltner, 2018). 
Trust among hackers has been studied with interesting results.  Dupont, Côté, 
Savine, and Décary-Hétu, (2016) provided results of a mixed methods study, which 
analyzed trust among hackers in the hacking community, through examining 
approximately 30,000 respondents “belonging to the largest computer hacking forum” 
(Dupont et al., 2016, p.129).  Findings from the analyzation of 449,478 collected 
feedbacks, over a 27-month period, from a random qualitative examination of 25,000 
feedbacks “…that a diverse set of behaviors, skills and attitudes trigger assessments of 
trustworthiness” (Dupont et al., 2016). 
What is portrayed in the news media on hacking should not be assumed to be 
reality.  Donner (2016) explored the gender gap of college students and cybercrime and 
found that the male gender committed more online offenses in all categories studied, 
including self-control and the amount of time spent in the virtual environment.  The 
quantitative study also found that both genders where equal in committing hacking and 
digital piracy offenses, when Internet usage was high (Donner, 2016).  The results of the 
study found to be contrary to what is being reported in the media and journalist accounts, 
while providing valuable “…insights into the complex mix of transactional, behavioral, 
and cultural factors that establish someone’s trustworthiness” (Dupont et al. 2016, p.131). 
Numerous elements contribute to the hacking culture. Reinis (2016) conducted a 




as school, family, and the neighborhood one lives to see if these elements played any role 
in the propensity to commit cybercrimes, specifically in the realm of hacking and illegal 
downloads.  The study involved 68,507 students from 30 countries and found “…parental 
control, attachment to family, self-control, attitudes toward violence, attachment and 
disorganization to school, and attachment, integration and disorganization of the 
neighborhood as possible predictors of illegal downloading and hacking” (Reinis, 2016, 
p.127).  Other studies have been conducted, by experts in the field, on criminal hacking 
behaviors and motivations (Chua and Holt, 2016; Young & Zhang, 2007; Bachmann, M. 
(2010).  
Motivational drive has been examined in many types of criminal cases in the 
criminal justice field.  Mansfield-Devine (2014) interviewed Amichai Shulman, who 
stated we must look at the motivations behind the cybercriminal’s actions, understanding 
why and how crimes are committed and who the targets are so it can be determined if 
there are criminal or political motivations involved, or if both are motivating factors.  It is 
challenging to identify what the true motivations are behind various attacks, although 
politically speaking there are tremendous advancements being made in offensive types of 
attacks, showing the “industrialization of hacking” (Mansfield-Devine, 2014, p.14). 
“Technologies sold by companies like Gamma Group and Hacking Team create cross-
border fact patterns that can seem more complex than traditional physical-world attacks” 
(Schultze, 2016, p. 895). 
Similarly, motivation plays a pivotal role in understanding different cultures and 




hackers and found their motivations and perceptions of who they are was instilled in them 
when they were young and no matter what the consequences are for hacking, it does not 
provide a deterrent for the acts of hacking.  An interesting concept was found through a 
study on hackers’ motivations, showing “Hackers appear to be more motivated by what 
they dislike rather than by what they value” (Madarie, 2017, p. 78).  Cultural values 
global may pose a number of challenges when addressing multinational policy initiatives. 
Privacy and Security 
Security and privacy are fundamental today given the virtual landscape and it is 
expected that individuals are afforded these assumed rights either by what is legislated or 
through ethical assumptions (Greengard, 2012).  Hooker and Pill (2016) showed how the 
legal arena is facing tremendous issues and is on target for major policy change over the 
years.  A privacy case involving many data breaches with the Wyndham hotel group 
established that the privacy breaches of consumer PII data were verifiable under the 
Federal Trade Commission Act (Hooker & Pill, 2016).  Privacy will be even more of an 
issue with the proliferation of big data and the continuous increase of data compromise in 
all virtual environments with connected devices, especially in the realm of the IoT, which 
opens increasing risks for an individual’s privacy (Lindqvist & Neumann, 2017; Riga, 
2017). 
Data breaches are occurring on a regular basis, with the amount of comprised data 
being reported in the billions according to recent reports, from 2005 through August 13, 
2017 there were 7,798 data breaches compromising the data of 904,769,967 records (The 




data scraping and determined there should be additional laws put in place to better 
distinguish between ethical and non-ethical data scraping, which should be criminalized 
as a data breach through robust anti-hacking legislation.  The compromised data being 
collected through data scraping has privacy and security implications in our modern-day 
society more than ever before.  Security practitioners and privacy advocates will need to 
help in the multidisciplinary approach of defining the security implications and helping in 
developing policies to address the escalating problem of data hacking (Din, 2015). 
Stone (2012) demonstrated, due to the present-day threat landscape, political 
campaigns should consider keeping important information out of the virtual environment, 
to help ensure there are no breaches that could have an impact on the efforts that have 
been put forth toward any given election process.  Considering the United States electoral 
process being hacked prior to the final presidential election in 2016, Shackelford et al. 
(2017) provided a study involving India, Germany, South Africa, Brazil, Estonia, and the 
United States on how their election processes are secured.  The study showed how voting 
systems are vulnerable in many ways, depending on the systems being used and could 
potentially alter the course of democracies around the world if voting outcomes were 
compromised (Shackleford et al., 2017). 
Certified public accounting (CPA) firms are buckling down to meet best standard 
practice goals for protecting their customer’s data, in efforts to mitigate the risks of 
criminal hackers, due to requirements from the regulatory realm (Lanz & Cohen, 2012). 
The banking industry is working to speed up managing and mitigating risks in the 




Mendelson, 2017).  Today banks are being breached not only for monetary gain, but for 
the sensitive information that can be obtained for other purposes, such as for political 
means (Mansfield-Devine, 2014). 
Gupta and Mata-Toledo (2016) showed how computer intrusions can cause 
irreparable damage to an individual through the access of personal information, likened 
to somebody having a full x-ray of your body with all the intricacies found within.  There 
are grave consequences, in the legislation realm, for committing a physical assault on a 
person, which can be likened to what happens in some cases when personal data is 
exposed, it is like a vertical weapon of assault (Gupta & Mata-Toledo, 2016).  From 
another perspective Snell (2016) elucidated that the more transparent our virtual world 
becomes, the more uncomfortable those that choose to lie and cheat will be, due to 
technologies encompassing practically every aspect of our daily lives, and the amount of 
data that is captured and preserved. 
A number of critical infrastructures that countries rely heavily on for keeping 
information private are vulnerable to hacking.  In medicine, personal information can be 
obtained or compromised through wireless hacking, as cited in (Denning et al., 2009) of 
brain computer interface (BCI) technologies, which showed ethical, security, and legal 
implications in relation to privacy (Ienca & Haselager, 2016).  Stone (2012) demonstrated 
political campaigns should consider keeping important information out of the virtual 
environment, to help ensure there are no breaches that could have an impact on the efforts 
that have been put forth toward any given election process.  Mansfield-Devine (2014) 




to a private sector organization, Mandiant, and various groups of the like, are responsible 
for the loss of PII of hospital patient records that accounted for patient data loss of 4.5 
million records. PR Newswire (2017) reported that most law firms in the United States 
are not knowledgeable to the threats they are vulnerable to and the number of times their 
systems have been compromised by hackers in 2016, according to a Logic Force survey 
involving 200 law firms. 
The tools used for technical intrusions are available on many fronts throughout 
the world, including retail markets.  Burkart and McCourt (2017) described how there are 
security and privacy concerns with packaged software that is being developed and 
distributed, in markets that have minimal regulation in the technological realm, for the 
purposes of online surveillance.  The European Union addressed, through policy, the 
protection of personally identifiable information in the form of a framework, which 
regulates marketing of PII (Burkart & McCourt, 2017).  This type of framework has not 
been implemented in the United States, although there is hope for these issues to be 
addressed through self-regulation in industry, which could potentially help in the 
implementation of international treaties addressing the trade in these markets for 
curtailing various security and privacy concerns, stated Burkart and McCourt (2017).  
According to a Canadian expert Michele Mosca with the University of Waterloo’s 
Institute for Quantum Computing, Co-founder and Program Director, stated Solomon 
(Encryption breaking quantum computers getting closer, warns Canadian expert, 2017), it 
is estimated that the RSA 2048 encryption could be broken within the next ten years, if 




Toronto.  The odds have now moved to a one in six chances, according to Mosca, and the 
“quantum computer will break the way we do cyber security, the way we do crypto 
(graphy) today, and we need to solve it” (as cited from Solomon in Encryption breaking 
quantum computers getting closer, warns Canadian expert, 2017).  Encryption today not 
only helps secure our critical infrastructures, while providing privacy to individuals and 
enterprises, it also provides a means for criminals to proceed with their criminal activities 
without being detected (The Day the Cryptography Dies, 2017).  Proactive coordinative 
efforts should be taken to help ensure societies can continue with the encryption 
technology that provides security in the virtual realm, while addressing the protection it 
provides to the criminal element (The Day the Cryptography Dies, 2017). 
Many security professionals have found that human error contributes a great deal 
to security compromise.  The human element in computer security is the weakest 
element, explained Brink (10 Questions with Derek Brink, 2003), while passwords have 
continued to present a problem in the virtual realm, an awareness approach to addressing 
the vulnerability of the human element can provide for improvements in moving forward 
in analyzing cybersecurity issues until there is a population that is mostly technological 
savvy given due to their experiences from inception.  “Technology is flawed, networks 
are porous, and all of it is powered by error-prone humans” (Williams, 2017, p. 6). 
Those committing virtual crimes can inflict a number of abuses on individuals, 
businesses, organizations, government entities, and nation states, to name a few.  Wilsem 
(2013) described the connections between hacking and harassment and how the 




produced from violence crimes, but with more far reaching consequences, such as with 
the hacking of personal information that can be used to destroy the reputation of an entity 
or an individual. These types of crimes will grow and the technological landscape 
continues to proliferate. Policy development should consider the lasting damages 
computer-focused and computer- assisted crimes cause the individual and/or the entities 
involved. 
The future should offer improvements in cybersecurity, in that the populations 
will have grown up with technological devices, providing for a population with a better 
understanding toward addressing technological issues (Ablon & Lubicki, 2016). With 
there being a total of 195 sovereign states around the world, global societies must 
continue to take a defensive stance with cyber intrusions until legislative bodies draft 
rules, and enforcement strategies for those rules, that will address all computer intrusion 
crimes (Williams, 2017).  Kosseff (2017) illustrated how the standards for privacy from 
the European Commission have set the course as the highest of standards and have stated 
that jurisdictions from the following countries have measured “to be adequate: Andorra, 
Argentina, Canada, Faeroe Islands, Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, Jersey, New Zealand, 
Switzerland, and Uruguay (Kosseff, 2017, Chapter 10). 
Policy and Law 
Government policy making has been noted by many to be slow, rather than 
expedient, when tackling issues that need to be addressed in the policy realm, in general.  
Sabett (2016) compared Moore’s law with the legislation implementation showing how 




Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA), although Moore’s law has stood the test of time and proven its predictability.  
To effectively prosecute crimes using the ECPA and the CFAA there needs to be a very 
good understanding of how security works in the cyber realm (Sabett, 2016).  This where 
a multidisciplinary approach comprising of subject matter experts may be beneficial in 
addressing ongoing multinational coordinative legislation initiatives. 
Cyber policy legislation has gained attention over the years with the evolving 
nature of technologies.  The United States National Security Act of 1947 and the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 predates the terminology of cybersecurity law, 
although these Acts have been revised since then, valuable insights can be gained from 
revisiting and closely examining documents of the past for establishing future policies 
(Williams, 2015).  The United States held many hearings starting in 1985 to accomplish 
what was later legislated as the Computer Security Act of 1987, which allowed for the 
National Security Agency to protect networks in relation to national security and for the 
National Bureau of Standards to protect networks in relation to federal entities, other than 
the Department of Defense (Warner, 2012).  
History has shown, expressed Warner (2012), the time in which it has taken for 
successfully addressing the cybersecurity issues of today, given U.S. government 
officials were being briefed in the 1960s.  The difficulty is addressing these technological 
issues was overwhelming at the time for, “…for any one agency or department to solve 
on its own, and too complicated for the White House and Capitol Hill to solve with any 




challenges in the legislative realm given the speed at which newer technologies are being 
developed. 
In February of 2016 the Cybersecurity National Action Plan (CNAP) was 
revealed in the by the U.S. government providing a framework in dealing with today’s 
computer intrusions, stated which included “enhance cybersecurity awareness and 
protections, protect privacy, maintain public safety as well as economic and national 
security, and empower Americans to take better control of their digital security (as cited 
from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/fact-sheet-
cybersecurity-national-action-plan)” stated Sabett (2017).  The Cybersecurity Information 
Sharing Act (CISA) was released in 2016 providing for voluntarily sharing information, 
in relation to cybersecurity, without having to fear legal repercussions (Sabett, 2017). 
On June 6, 2016, the Boston Global Forum announced, “Leaders at the G7 
Summit approved the first international stand-alone agreement on cybersecurity, 
including data protection and Internet governance” 
(http://bostonglobalforum.org/2016/06/g7-leaders-produce-historic-cybersecurity-
agreement/)”  The group of 7 (G7), the United Kingdom, Germany, France, the United 
States, Canada, Japan, and Italy, have been working to establish common ground for 
addressing human rights issues in relation to the cyber realm, which includes privacy and 
the continuation of information and communication technology freedoms (Shackleford, 
2017, a). Shackleford (2017a) continued to show how there is a need for coordinative 
efforts toward “verification, transparency, and extraterritoriality in the sustainable due 




considerations” (Shackleford, 2017a, pp.884-885).  Shackleford (2017a) further 
illustrated what the consequences would be if we choose not to address issues of due 
diligence in cybersecurity, in that we will be facing, as cited from (Bendiek, supra note 
75, at 32) a “collision course for different national legal systems, which would encourage 
the fragmentation of the global economic space and the Internet” (Shackleford, 2017a, p. 
885). 
Shackleford et al. (2017) illustrated how some countries are developing policies 
and legislation to address the cyber vulnerabilities of their critical infrastructures. In the 
context of the election processes around the world, which could be appropriated as 
critical infrastructures, information sharing among international bodies and a physical 
paper audit trail of every individual vote, provides a couple of elements that can be 
addressed in the electoral processes for helping to mitigate the inherent risks involved in 
voting processes, while improving the election infrastructures around the world 
(Shackleford et al., 2017).   McMillan (2009) showed how, just prior to China’s 
strengthened cyber laws, some professionals in IT chose to take the crime route during a 
time of economic struggle in china.  An approach of broadening the definition of 
cybercrime and extending the penalties to fit the “tremendous social harm” (as from 
McMillian, 2009, p. 74) has been taken to help mitigate the virtual crimes the world is 
facing today. 
International law considers universal jurisdiction, which provides nation state 
courts the ability to hold criminal actors accountable for their crimes through prosecution, 




the intricacies involved in universal jurisdiction prosecutions and international relations 
(International Law - Universal Jurisdiction - United Kingdom Adds Barrier to Private 
Prosecution of Universal Jurisdiction Crimes, 2012).  An example can be seen through 
The United Kingdom Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act of 2011, which has 
made it more difficult for universal jurisdiction cases to work in some cases given a new 
requirement of “consent of the U.K. Director of Public Prosecutions before a U.K. court 
can issue a privately sought arrest warrant for universal jurisdiction offenses.  The 
requirement separates universal jurisdiction crimes from the arrest warrant procedures for 
domestic crimes in the United Kingdom” (International Law - Universal Jurisdiction - 
United Kingdom Adds Barrier to Private Prosecution of Universal Jurisdiction Crimes, 
2012). 
A new approach for addressing the governance problems in securing our 
information, proposed Elkin-Korerd and Haber (2016), showed how a nonbiased 
oversight body could provide the needed insight on how information is used in the ever-
increasing world of transparency, rather than trying to track down how the information 
was procured.  For civilian liberties and global security to be equally addressed, online 
intermediaries and public-private partnerships, along with an oversight body providing a 
proxy for governance, would allow governmental agencies the needed information from 
networks and distributed networks for addressing criminal acts without overstepping the 
boundaries of civil liberties (Elkin-Korerd & Haber, 2016).  
Trotta (2017) explained how a mixture of expert technocrat knowledge, coupled 




by helping to ensure policy solutions are brought to the table. Visher and Weisburd 
(1998) showed how there needs to be tailored approaches for crime prevention strategies, 
to help ensure recidivism rates decrease and are potentially alleviated.  These approaches 
should involve concerted efforts among stakeholders in establishing and implementing 
unique programs with precise elements for addressing a specific type of crime (Visher & 
Weisburd, 1998). 
The General Data and Privacy Regulation (GDPR), put into full force on May 25, 
2018, provides strict penalties for companies not adhering to the regulation in the EU, as 
well as for companies that do business with the EU abroad.  Goddard (2017), Director of 
policy and Standards, MRS, and Director of Policy and Communications for EFAMRO, 
states “GDPR goes beyond current law in demanding higher standards for organisations 
processing data – but these higher standards are philosophically in line with best practice 
and ethical approaches that are practiced by research practitioners” Goddard (2017) goes 
on to state, “GDPR builds on transparency and trust enshrined in national and 
international codes with best practices that put the interests of research participants 
rightfully at the center” (2017, p. 705).  
The 2014 Sony breach provided an example of how international law has not been 
able to address nation state cyber-attacks, according to many expert legal examinations of 
the international law, for assigning criminal culpability for the actions taken by North 
Korea in response to a scheduled release of the movie The Interview (Shackelford, 2017b; 
Sullivan, 2015; & Walton, 2017 ). Contrary to some scholarly thoughts and proposals of 




treaties, Walton (2017, p. 1460) suggested a liability and duty centered approach, which 
would specifically address “low intensity” destructive cyber-attacks that fall outside of 
what is currently addressed and understood by many under international law.  This 
approach “that derives from a preexisting but underutilized source of international law: 
liability for transboundary harm” (Walton, 2017, p.1464), would use the “harm” element 
in relation to a low-intensity cyber-attacks from any nation state, with a special focus on 
the responsibilities of the state, providing for consideration for the acts to be criminal 
through international law (Walton, 2017). 
Existing laws and treaties can be used to address our current cybersecurity issues 
stated Shackelford (2017b), we can look at “…how the public law of cyber peace may be 
combined with private international law to create the legal foundation for a global culture 
of cybersecurity (Shackelford, 2017b, p.9) 1st article.”  The International 
Telecommunication Union treaty has been used, along with bilateral and multilateral 
treaties related to investments and trade, to provide a case for prosecuting private entities 
for cyber-attacks internationally (Shackelford, 2017b). Shackelford (2017b) showed how 
G20 has been instrumental in promoting the law of cyber peace internationally by 
examining the conduct of nation states in the virtual realm, including the acts of 
espionage and critical infrastructure protection in a holistic collaborative forum.  
Considering the role each nation plays for responsibly addressing the security of 
the citizenry and the efforts put forth by normative powers in promoting a modicum of 
peace throughout conflict stricken global societies, Bengtsson and Elgstrom (2012) 




showing what is expected from the EU in helping to provide solutions for international 
issues in the realm of international relations.  Although, the role of the EU is sometimes 
perceived in conflict to what is expected from the national actor in the context of role 
theory and how it plays out on the international scene, the EU is positively setting the 
stage for additional nation states to come on the scene in their modern-day attempts in 
accepting and implementing a democracy landscape on some fronts (Bengtsson & 
Elgstrom, 2012).  
The role of international leaders will be instrumental in propelling change in the 
cyber policy realm.  Abigbuo (2007) stated, as cited from (Holsti, 1970), how role theory 
provides a fundamental impetus for contributing to foreign policy efforts and positively 
adding to the models of International Relations (IR) theories, including how 
multidisciplinary leaders perceive their role on the political scene and what is expected in 
relation to their participation. Role theory in foreign policy, illustrated Adigbuo (2007), 
as cited from (Adigbuo, 2005; LePrestre, 1997), encompasses concepts of any of the 
following elements; behaviors that are expected, the rank of any given participatory 
individual, or the acts of an influencer or contributor. Role theory, with its 
multidisciplinary approach, provides a positive focus for moving forward with how 
Nigeria will define its role among national leaders for dealing with policy issues 
(Adigbuo, 2007). 
International cooperation efforts have been underway on several fronts, as 
reported in the Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) 2017 Secretary-




since the inception of the OECD over 50 years ago.  Working multilaterally with the 
cooperation of a wide array of stakeholders, including Public Private Partnerships (PPP), 
to address the issues relating to the present-day technological landscape and emerging 
technology issues (Secretary-Generals’ Report to Ministers, OECD, 2017).  The Strategic 
Orientations of the Secretary-General, Meeting of the OECD Council at the Ministerial 
Level, in June 2017 provided a strategic framework overview for establishing improved 
policies and multilateral cooperation and insights for the wellbeing of global 
communities, examining exclusion obstacles, and the use of metrics for driving better 
decision making processes, among the international collective body of 35 countries, for 
strengthening multilateral cooperation efforts toward addressing global issues and 
establishing international policies. 
International coordinated efforts have continued toward an international 
consensus on some fronts, as touched upon in chapter 1.  While there are international 
initiatives underway to secure the cyber realm, including strategies being developed to 
address the intricacies involved in cyber-criminal activities, confusion exists on how the 
global community should proceed forward in confronting the problems the world is 
facing today in cyberspace (Weber & Studer, 2016).  There continues to be a gap in 
internationally developed and adopted policy frameworks for addressing today’s 
cybercrimes and our virtual security (Weber & Studer, 2016).  Upol (2014) explained 
how the Group of Eight organization became the Group of Seven after Russia was not 
invited back due to their involvement in the Ukraine crisis and Russia taking Crimea. It 




acquisition of part or all of another state’s territory through coercion or force” (Upol, 
2014, para. 1). 
Garris (2017) illustrated the need for a collaboration of international entities for 
capturing major cybercrime organizations.  As cited from (Germano, 2014), public and 
private partnerships are essential for addressing cyber threats but there is a need to 
overcome the obstacles that are preventing fruition of these partnerships, which include 
control issues in relation to incident response, liability in the evolutionary regulatory 
realm, cross border criminal investigations, and disclosure issues (Garris, 2017).  In the 
United States, elaborated Schultze (2016), technological crimes can be prosecuted 
without the creation of new laws by using the intricacies of established legislations that 
were originally implemented for addressing traditional crimes, such as The Wiretap Act, 
which addresses intrusive technologies, such as spyware, and The Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity Act (FISA), which recognizes various exceptions to immunity.  “Under the 
CFAA, unauthorized access to a protected computer is punishable by a fine or by 
imprisonment” (Schultze, 2016, p.245). 
Work has been accomplished on a number of fronts in addressing criminal 
hacking.  According to Kosseff (2017) various laws in the United States are used to help 
authorities in prosecuting the crimes of criminal hacking. The following are laws that 
have helped in bringing counts of violations against various entities, including single 
count violations, which carry prison sentences of approximately 10 years or more. 
• The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 




• Section 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
• Economic Espionage Act 
• Stored Communication Act (section 2701) 
Kosseff (2017) continued to elaborate how some nations have done more than the 
U.S. in providing a legal framework for regulating data security and privacy.  The 
following five countries, which are the largest counties for U.S. trading, have established 
regulations for addressing cybersecurity: European Union implemented the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) that updated their 1995 privacy law, Canada uses the 
Personal Information and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) as their primary data 
security and privacy law, China uses the Consumer Protection Law, Mexico uses eight 
principals, which requires consent through various methods for undeniable clarity, and 
Japan mostly uses the Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI) to govern 
their data security and privacy (Kosseff, 2017). 
There is a good deal of work ahead in policy making for determining all the 
variables that make up criminal hacking, including the various methods used in the 
exploits.  Victimization of hacking is an area with little research, although it should be 
fundamentally considered when approaching the policies that are established for 
punishing the offenses of criminal hacking, elucidated Wilsem (2013).  There is the need 
for additional research in the motivating factors behind victimizing through hacking 
and/or malware infections, to establish more effective policies for computer intrusions, 




Rashkovski et al. (2016) displayed how the Republic of Macedonia has been 
affected by punishable cybercrimes, which includes those that have been identified in 
relation to information and communication technologies that encompass the networks of 
the Internet, computers and connected devices, and mobile devices.  The Republic of 
Macedonia has the least in numbers of Internet users, according to Rashkovski et al. 
(2016) study, but ranked second, after the United States, in the number of crimes 
reported.  Although the Republic of Macedonia’s legislative realm is moving forward 
addressing cybercrime, with the best standards in motion today throughout the world, 
Rashkovski et al. (2016) explained there is more needed to help in the global efforts, by 
including the authorities of Macedonia in global efforts toward finding solutions for 
adverting the criminal activities and enforcing more stringent strategies in addressing and 
mitigating the effects of cybercrime. 
Pun (2017) described cyber espionage as being like the Cold War espionage with 
aircraft spying activities, where “…malware deployed can be changed on-the-fly to 
achieve a destructive capacity rather than mere surveillance (and often does so to wipe its 
traces from the hardware).  For the victim state in both cases, there is fear the vehicle is 
intended for combat rather than surveillance” (2017, p.375).  On Sept. 25, 2015 it was 
revealed that the United States and China had come to an agreement that each country 
would not steal trade secrets and would put forth concerted efforts to help ensure trade 
and economic proprietary information is not gained through cyber theft (The Latest: US, 
China Agree Not to Steal Trade Secrets, 2015).  More recently Kennedy and Xiaoyan 




Many of the same hacking tools and techniques used by law enforcement entities 
are being used by criminals (Sommer, 2006).  A study proposed a policy approach for the 
criminalization of computer intrusion tools, although it was noted there would be an 
impact felt in the areas outside of law enforcement, including those entities that use 
penetration tools in the academic environment and for ethical business purposes 
(Sommer, 2006).  Ghappour (2017) pointed out how a standard framework needs to be 
adopted to help ensure there is consistency in the practices of cross-border investigation, 
which will play an important role in the policy environment for establishing and reaching 
a uniform framework for the crimes of criminal hacking (Hui, Kim, & Wang, 2017).  
Criminal hacking investigations can be investigated and speedily addressed 
legislatively through various international assistance channels.  These channels involve 
using informal cooperation methods of business to business investigative contacts, in the 
public or private sectors, or through formal cooperation methods, which involve a more 
in-depth approach of working with national governments and may require mutual legal 
assistance through a treaty, which is required for any type of digital evidence transfers 
relating to interception of communications and search and seizures (How Businesses Can 
Speed up International Cybercrime Investigations, 2017).  Newer approaches, in 
addressing rulemaking and policies holistically, on a global scale, in the cyber realm 
could offer even more investigative efficiencies for the future. 
“The individual-agent approach to prosecuting hackers recently bore its first fruit. 
On March 22, 2016 in the United States v. Su Bin, a Chinese businessman living in 




Act… “(Schultze, 2016 p. 245).  This espionage hacking incident was criminalized for 
compromising Boeing, a United States aircraft company, servers and stealing trade 
secrets (Schultze, 2016).  Although initiatives have been underway in addressing 
cybercrime, stated Greengard (2012), China and Russia are not represented in one of the 
more prominent initiative of the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime.  With 
no global policy in sight for addressing cybercrime, we have much to work on, including 
the “increasing continuous battle over rights, responsibilities, and resources” (Greengard, 
2012). 
The Black Report, a study involving a survey of professional penetration testers, 
hackers, and incident responders, led by Pogue (2018), addressed the hacking ability 
from the diverse population of 112 respondents.  The study showed 34 percent of the 
respondents said they have been hacking 10 or more years and approximately 67 percent 
of the respondents said they spent more than 10 hours a week “bypassing IT security 
systems” (Progue, The Black Report, 2018, p. 9).  Future studies may garner additional 
insights toward the number of individuals, among the global population, who have 
technical abilities and the skills required to hack into secured systems.  These studies may 
offer various perspectives for the legislative realm in addressing how policies should be 
built, in relation to criminal hacking offenses, and what defines criminal hacking 
offenses, as a universal policy. 
Hacking skills can be very valuable in today’s virtual landscape environment, 
provided they are used in ethical ways.  Various public and private sector entities have 




cybersecurity vulnerabilities in systems.  The United States Air Force initiated a program 
that allowed hackers to hack Air Force systems in efforts to find vulnerabilities, and how 
this structured program has continued on to its third round of inviting hackers to hack the 
Air Force, through an invitation to 191 countries, for the opportunity to find 
vulnerabilities in a system recently moved to the virtual cloud (Cordell, 2018). 
Although ethical hackers provide a great service in helping companies with their 
cybersecurity needs, new creative approaches are needed for addressing the intricacies 
associated with criminal hacking.  Huang, Siegel, and Madnick (2018) illustrated crimes 
related to various hacking services and innovations have grown to several trillion dollars 
and are estimated to reach approximately six trillion over the next couple of years (as 
cited from Steve Morgan, 2016 – Hackerpocalypse: A Cybercrime Revelation. Technical 
Report. Cybersecurity Ventures. 1-24).  With approximately one third of companies being 
touched by cybercrime, policies, outside of the realm of protection protocols, are needed 
to encourage additional proactive actions to help curtail the effectiveness of the 
cybercrime business (Huang et al., 2018). 
There is need to holistically understand the hacking culture today in order to 
successfully address solutions to the problem of criminal hacking.  A study, conducted by 
Absolute Software Corporation, found approximately one third of the IT personnel in the 
United States, surveyed admitted to hacking in their organization (2016, February 19).  
Additionally, the study showed among the information security practitioner respondents, 
that those between the ages of 18-44 were more apt to hack into their own organization 




age and older were less likely to hack into their own organization (12 percent of 
respondents aged 45 and older). 
There are differing opinions on the types of policies that should be implemented 
for punishing the crimes of criminal hacking.  In examining the disparities of penalties 
associated with various computer intrusion crimes, such as with hacktivism and 
Anonymous, Tomblin and Jenion (2016) argued that policy makers and sentencing 
imposed by justice systems around the world should be minimized in relation to recent 
trends of stricter punishments.  A study conducted using age and crime, the curve showed 
most offenses lesson or desist as individuals age out of their teens and twenties, which 
offers valuable insight for policy makers in evaluating the effectiveness of deterrence 
methods (Tomblin & Jenion, 2016). 
Summary and Conclusions 
The major themes covered in the literature touch on various aspects of 
cybercrime, privacy, security, the hacking culture, and multinational policies and laws in 
the cybersecurity realm, which provided an in-depth look at the threat landscape of the 
technological realm for future policy considerations.  The threat landscape, consisting of 
individual and group actors of criminal hacking, the methodologies and tools used to 
accomplish their missions, and the targets they aim to compromise, as illustrated by 
Weber and Studer (2016), should be understood holistically, with a team of subject 
matter experts for appropriately addressing a framework for international policy 
implementation for the criminal activities of hacking.  The threat landscape encompasses 




state policies, cultural differences, and the propagation of the hacking community, all of 
which play some role, on the international scene, in relation to intrusions in the 
technological realm (Walden, 2004). 
There is much to sift through when holistically addressing policies related to the 
acts of criminal hacking, and for consideration to be implemented at the international 
level.  Those that commit the crimes, their methods, and their targets furnishes some of 
the elements needed for developing a framework for an international policy standard 
(Banks, 2017; Thaw, 2014).  It is not known the extent in which criminal hacking takes 
place on a personal level through the various methods used for accessing all types of 
virtual technologies, although studies have shown, through private sector organization 
reports, that the number of network intrusions are continuously escalating. 
The purpose of this quantitative dissertation was to explore the relationship 
between individuals in the public and private sectors and their attitudes toward the need 
for one international law for defining criminal hacking and the penalties associated with 
the act of criminal hacking.  This study provided for extended knowledge to be gained in 
the cybersecurity realm, consisting of data contributions among multidisciplinary 
individuals on criminalization standards for the acts of technological intrusion crimes. 
The questions of the study furnished a foundation that was examined using descriptive 
and inferential statistics that provided the perceptions among individual stakeholders in 
the public and private sectors.  An identification of differential standards for the 
definitions and punishments of criminal hacking were gained in hopes to help propel 




promote international efforts for working in concert to establish policy solutions that can 




Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative dissertation was to explore the relationship 
between individuals in the public and private sectors and their attitudes toward the need 
for one international law for defining criminal hacking and the penalties associated with 
the act of criminal hacking.  In this study, I sought to find meaningful relationships 
between the independent and dependent variables of the study (see Appendix A). 
Valuable insights were gained from the individuals surveyed about their attitudes toward 
the need for an international law in defining and penalizing criminal hacking, which 
could potentially be used to promote further research in the arena of international 
cooperation efforts toward implementing consistent universal policies and laws 
addressing criminal hacking in the borderless realm of information and communication 
technologies. 
This chapter consists of the research design and rationale, methodology, data 
analysis plan, threats to validity, ethical procedures, and a summary of the chapter.  The 
research design addressed the research scientifically, using descriptive and inferential 
research.  The logic behind the methodology in participant selection included the 
knowledge of those involved in the entities chosen as well as the expertise of individual 
stakeholders relevant in the discipline of the study.  
The components in the published instrumentation, provided through the Qualtrics 
statistical platform Stats iQ, addressed reliability and validity, while providing reliability 




through predictive and construct validity.  Instrumentation sufficiency was established 
through the Qualtrics survey platform to help ensure each respondent had the ability to 
appropriately provide answers for the research questions of the study.  Survey rating 
scales, including Likert and semantic differential scales, were used to address the study 
from a deductive reasoning approach.  The data analysis plan encompassed the use of the 
Qualtrics statistical software for the survey and the analysis of the data.  Ethical 
procedures were explained and approached using best standard practices put forth by the 
official institutional Internal Review Board (IRB), which included a consent form.  
The setting involved a structured survey for quantitative data collection accessed 
through the reputable Qualtrics platform, which played a fundamental part in the 
structure of the research design for the study.  Individual stakeholders in the public and 
private sectors, with some affiliation to cybersecurity through various organizations (see 
Appendix A), and their networking and social groups were provided survey questions 
through an anonymous link.  These individual respondents represented a unique 
knowledge base in the cybersecurity realm, which encompassed various perspectives in 
relation to the study questions.  
The survey (see Appendix B) was sent to security organizations and LinkedIn 
networks in cybersecurity, where the memberships and networks were made up of a vast 
array of individuals from public and private sectors, including various representatives 
from critical infrastructure sectors.  These multidisciplinary memberships provided 
professional insights to the study with their expertise and knowledge for addressing the 




compromise, with an understanding that these acts can affect any given critical 
infrastructure or society. 
The quantitative study examined individual attitudes toward an international law 
governing the cyber realm in relation to defining criminal hacking and the penalties 
associated with the act, and if there is a difference in the attitudes of individual 
respondents among public and private sectors. The independent variables of the study 
included age group, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical hacking 
ability, and education, which related to the hypotheses by providing, through correlation, 
what the relationship is between the dependent variables, of attitudes toward the need for 
international laws for defining criminal hacking and penalties, and the individuals 
associated with the public and private sectors, for the question of the study (see Appendix 
A). 
Research Design and Rationale 
Creswell (2016) advised detailing the core principles that should be included in 
the research design, including concerted efforts toward development, analysis of the 
problem, proactive planning of the research process through documentation, and suitable 
measures taken for implementing and evaluating the generalized conclusions through 
critical reasoning.  This study provided a framework that incorporated best standard 
practices throughout the research process.  Kanji (2006) explained that tests are not to be 
designed to gain an approval or disapproval of hypotheses but to show the hypotheses 
being tested are “untenable as it leads to an unsatisfactorily small probability” (p. 2). 




helps provide informative and trustworthy results, provided the communication method is 
effective when demonstrating the results. 
Mills (1992) illustrated the importance of understanding that science seeks the 
truth through an objective means, while questions of value are intended to be a part of the 
policy process, including problems associated with technological progress.  Policy issues 
require concerted efforts between scientists and policy makers to define and address 
fundamental technical and policy elements, including the scientific community putting 
facts in order to assess problems and potential solutions; policy makers have the task of 
proposing effective legislation after considering all the varying values put forth (Mills, 
1992).  In the policy realm, decision makers have obligations to future generations in 
making the best decisions with relevant available information involving the expertise of 
various entities in the scientific community (Mills, 1992). 
Due to the evolving nature of the threat landscape in the cyber world, issues are 
addressed in relation to the need for concerted unified global efforts in collectively 
coordinating universally consistent policies for the penalties of criminal hacking.  The 
central concept of the study revolved around exploring the attitudes of individuals among 
the public and private sectors on the need to have an international law for defining 
criminal hacking, the need to have an international law for the punishments of criminal 
hacking, and to what extent the acts of criminal hacking should be penalized. Morse, 
Niehaus, Wolfe, and Wilkins (2006) clarified how a theoretical drive should be clearly 
defined in the study, which helps to ensure the direction of the research study is on track 




Role theory was used as the theoretical drive to show how roles play a critical part 
in addressing the problems of criminal hacking.   The rationale for the design of the study 
was chosen to gain perceptions and insights from the individual participant data for 
evaluating the need for an international law for defining criminal hacking and the 
punishments for the crimes, as well as fulfilling a gap in the literature in addressing 
international unified policy standards in the technological realm.  
Structured closed-end question surveys were made available via e-mail invitation 
to various participants with ties to the cybersecurity realm to the memberships of several 
security organizations on behalf of the researcher, their networking groups, and LinkedIn 
networking groups with a cybersecurity professional presence served as the research 
sampling units.  There was not a relationship of power over any of the proposed subjects 
for the study.  The use of anonymous data collection, through a virtual survey, helped in 
obtaining responses that were accurate from the individual respondents.  Any biases were 
managed by conducting the study in an objective manner, helping to ensure the true 
results of the nonexperimental research study were provided. 
Study Variables 
The following provides the independent variables (IVs), dependent variables 
(DVs), and groups for the study (See Appendix A). 
DVs: The dependent variables for the study are: 
o DV1: Attitudes toward the need for one international law for defining 




o DV2: Attitudes toward the need for the penalties of criminal hacking to be 
addressed under one international law? 
o DV3: Attitudes toward the extent that criminal hacking should be 
penalized, given it would be implemented globally? 
The independent variables for the study are:  
o IV1 – Age group (ratio scale) 
o IV2 – Ethnicity (nominal) 
o IV3 – Gender (dichotomous) 
o IV4 – Infrastructure sector affiliation (nominal) 
o IV5 – Technical hacking ability (dichotomous) 
o IV6 – Education (nominal) 
The groups for the study are: 
Groups – Employment sector (nominal) 
o Public sector 
o Private sector 
Methodology 
Population 
The population for the study targeted multidisciplinary professionals from the 
public and private sectors who worked directly, indirectly, or had some knowledge in the 
security, cybersecurity, and legislative realms, as well as their networking groups and 
LinkedIn networks.  Additionally, the Walden Research Participant Pool was approved 




gain a sample population through the Qualtrics statistical platform, which supplies survey 
respondents for a charge, this option was not used in that there was an adequate number 
of respondents, gained through the initial sampling strategy.  The initial sampling frame 
was chosen because the population is necessary for the scope of the study in gaining a 
representation of the knowledge base that made up those that can influence policy 
initiatives. 
Sampling and Procedures 
For this quantitative study, the sample size was determined prior to the 
dissemination of this survey.  To determine the sample size the target population was 
determined, those that have some affiliation with the cybersecurity community.  The 
population size can be hard to estimate in many cases and is unknown for the parameters 
of this study, therefore a standard equation was used to statistically determine the sample 
size.  
The confidence level for the study was set at 95%, which is a good and 
recommended standard for scholarly studies, according to many statistical experts. 95% 
provides a Z Score that equals 1.96, for the numerical portion of the statistical equation 
for calculating the sample size, according to Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Determining Sample 
Size, par. 5, retrieved from https://www.qualtrics.com/experience-
management/research/determine-sample-size/).  The standard of deviation, or the 
variance expected in the survey responses, was set at the standard of .5, given the 
adequate sample size. The margin of error, also known as the confidence interval, was set 




and the confidence interval was used to determine the sample size for an unknown 
population size*(Qualtrics, Determining Sample Size, para. 4, retrieved from 
https://www.qualtrics.com/experience-management/research/determine-sample-size/). 
Necessary Sample Size = (Z-score)² * StdDev*(1-StdDev) / (margin of error)² 
Using the above standard equation, with the parameters set for the study shown 
above, the following provides the statistical equation from the sample size formula 
according to the Qualtrics sample size calculation (Qualtrics, Determining Sample Size, 
para 6, retrieved from https://www.qualtrics.com/experience-
management/research/determine-sample-size/).  
((1.96)² x .5(.5)) / (.05)² 
(3.8416 x .25) / .0025 
.9604 / .0025 
384.16 
385  
It is sometimes necessary for researchers to adjust the parameters a bit for sample 
sizes that are too large, which increases the chances for errors from the sampling, which 
can be done by increasing your margin of error or decreasing your confidence level 
(Qualtrics, Determining Sample Size, retrieved from 
https://www.qualtrics.com/experience-management/research/determine-sample-size/).  
Similarly, Raosoft provided a sample size calculator that allows researchers to 
input the percentages of the margin of error (showing 5% as a common choice), 




for unknown population sizes), and response distribution, or standard of deviation at .5 
(Raosoft Sample Size Calculator, retrieved from 
http://www.raosoft.com/samplesize.html).  Using 5% as a margin of error to accept, 95% 
as the confidence level, 20,000 for the unknown population size, and 50% as the standard 
of deviation, the recommended sample size is 377 (Raosoft Sample Size Calculator, 
retrieved from http://www.raosoft.com/samplesize.html). 
The quantitative survey was sent out to national, international, and statewide 
organizations that hold membership populations in the security realm as a sample 
population through the executive leadership of a number of non-profit organizations. 
Additional opportunities for the networking groups of these groups to be surveyed 
through referral sampling, was used as an additional sample for the sample population. 
An email was sent to these organizations and LinkedIn network groups inviting 
individual participation in the survey. 
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection 
The procedures for recruitment, participation, and data collection included 
reaching out to executive board members of the various security organizations to gain 
approval to sample their membership population, which included public and private 
sectors individuals involved in various cybersecurity organizations.  An email was sent to 
the members of these organizations by the leadership of the organization on behalf of the 
researcher, and LinkedIn network groups inviting individual participation in the survey. 
Surveys were distributed and gained through a reputable survey platform, 




distributions, if needed, as a back-up for a sample population for the study.  The manual 
distribution, through the platform, provided a generic survey link and collected all 
responses anonymously.  To help ensure respondents did not use the survey link multiple 
times, the option tab was selected, which prevented ballot box stuffing. 
Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs 
The quantitative instrumentation consisted of a structured survey with closed 
ended questions using survey Likert rating scales.  The survey (see Appendix B) 
consisted of a researcher-developed questionnaire consisting of Likert and semantic 
differential rating scales administered through Qualtrics, a published reputable survey 
software platform.  Using Qualtrics single user student license and Stats iQ (Qualtrics, 
Provo, UT, 2019 -2020) assisted in establishing consistency measures internally through 
the correlation of the data sets, including measures that addressed similarities within the 
questions being measured.  
Operationalization for Variables 
The independent variables (IVs), dependent variables (DVs), and groups for the 
study were operationalized and measured in a number of ways to show the correlations 
and relationship between variables.  Independent Variables were nominally and 
dichotomously measured, as well as through ratio scale measurement.  The independent 
variables, including the groups of the study, and the dependent variables from the survey 
results were coded for statistical analyses for determining the outcomes for the questions 




Data Analysis Plan 
Qualtrics stats IQ statistical software was used for the analysis for the research 
study.  Validating the data through an auditing, repetitious process to ensure accuracy of 
the data input, which included the utilization of the Qualtrics platform for dataset 
examination.  Kanji (2006) explained tests are not to be designed to gain an approval or 
disapproval of hypotheses, but to show the hypotheses being tested is “untenable as it 
leads to an unsatisfactorily small probability (Kanji, 2006, p. 2).”  Expert mentoring 
through Walden University, in the quantitative process, was established and served as an 
audit element in helping to ensure reliability and validity throughout the quantitative 
process.  The following provides the research questions and hypotheses for the study. 
RQ1: Do age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical 
hacking ability, and education predict the attitudes toward the need for one international 
law for defining criminal hacking between public and private sector entities? 
H01: Age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical 
hacking ability, and education do not predict the attitudes toward the need for one 
international law for defining criminal hacking between public and private sector 
individuals? 
H11: Age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical 
hacking ability, and education do predict the attitudes toward the need for one 





RQ2: Do age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical 
hacking ability, and education predict the attitudes toward the need for the penalties of 
criminal hacking to be addressed under one international law between public and private 
sector individuals? 
H02: Age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical 
hacking ability, and education do not predict the attitudes toward the need for the 
penalties of criminal hacking to be addressed under one international law between 
public and private sector individuals? 
H12: Age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical 
hacking ability, and education do predict the attitudes toward the need for the 
penalties of criminal hacking to be addressed under one international law between 
public and private sector individuals? 
RQ3: Is there a difference among age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure 
sector affiliation, technical hacking ability, and education on the attitudes toward the 
extent criminal hacking, as defined from the example in the study, needs modification of 
stricter or lesser penalties between public and private sector individuals? 
H03: There is no difference among age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure 
sector affiliation, technical hacking ability, and education on the attitudes toward 
the extent criminal hacking, as defined from the examples in the study, needs 





H13: There is a difference among age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure 
sector affiliation, technical hacking ability, and education on the attitudes toward 
the extent criminal hacking, as defined from the examples in the study, needs 
modification of stricter or lesser penalties between public and private sector 
individuals? 
The appropriate calculated alpha, power, and effect size was determined, as well a 
calculated minimum sample size, prior to proceeding with running the statistical tests. 
The nominal, dichotomous and ratio scale survey outcomes were coded using the most 
current Qualtrics Stats iQ software database.  The coded survey results were statistically 
tested. Datasets were formulated from the coded independent, dependent, and groups 
input for analysis in determining if the null hypotheses would be accepted or if the null 
hypotheses would be rejected and the alternative hypotheses accepted, for each question 
of the study in Chapter 4.  
Chi-squared statistical analysis was run providing the statistical data needed for 
the results of the study.  Descriptive statistical analysis was conducted through data 
observation and compared and contrasted through inferential statistical analysis.  The 
quantitative process provided for deductive data analysis, as well as provided a platform 
for objectivity within the elemental processes of the study.  Concerted efforts were taken 
to help ensure there were no Type I or Type II errors in the testing procedures. Type I 
errors involve rejecting a true hypothesis due to testing procedures and Type II errors 
involve rejecting a false null hypothesis due to testing procedures.  It has been stated by a 




like an innocent defendant being convicted and making a Type II error is like letting a 
criminal go free, by gaining an acquittal.  
Threats to Validity 
External validity was addressed through generalizability, where the threats may 
include not examining the results of a study against the results of similar studies to show 
how the findings apply to the answers of the research questions. 
Ihantola and Kihn (2011) illustrated how an appropriate research design is critical 
for the context of the study for providing a framework that mitigates the threats to 
validity.  Threats to internal validity can take place any time during the study, which 
could include a lack of knowledge in relation to the study, where the logic presented is 
contradictory to most of the research, or toward the end of the study when interpreting 
and analyzing the data (Ihantola & Kihn, 2011).  Ihantola and Kihn (2011) displayed, 
through the studies of (Campbell & Stanely 163 in, Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998, p.87) 
that issues with instrumentation can pose a threat to internal validity in the data collection 
phase.  Through the study of (Onwuegbuzie, 2003) Ihantola and Kihn (2011) showed 
how bias can influence a study using technological tools and the way in which the 
researcher chooses to interpret the findings according to their preferred techniques. 
Steps were taken to help provide a holistic representative for capturing of the data, 
in efforts to ensure the credibility of the findings, including procedural reliability, with 
auditing expertise in the analysis of the statistical processes. (Inhantola & Kihn, 2011; 




study to help ensure validity, credibility for the internal validity and transferability for the 
external validity.  
Questions that should be answered in relation to the assumptions of the 
quantitative paradigm include looking at the study through lenses ontologically, 
epistemologically, axiological, rhetorically, and methodologically (Creswell, 2014). 
Creswell (2014) stated addressing the question of reality should be objectively examined, 
the assumption that the researcher will be independent from the study, role assumption 
should be unbiased and free of values, the language of the research should be formal and 
quantitatively impersonal, and the methodological assumption of the study should ensure 
the research encompasses a deductive process through generalizations, validity, and 
reliability. 
Ethical Procedures 
Agreement documents for participants were formulated to comply with Internal 
Review Board (IRB) standards for the treatment of participants in the study and were 
included in the IRB application. Approvals and permissions were granted by the IRB 
before the start of the proposed study.  Ethical elements were addressed throughout every 
stage of the study according to the official institutional IRB best standard practices and 
protocols.  
A formal email was sent electronically, through the associations and LinkedIn 
networks on behalf of the researcher, describing the purpose of the study and why it is 
relevant today with an anonymous survey link inviting individuals to be a voluntary 




Appendix B).  The survey was completely anonymous, including not capturing the IP 
addresses of those responding to the survey.  This was made possible by selecting this 
option through the Qualtrics platform. 
Privacy risks were minimal in that the survey respondents were completely 
anonymous.  By sending a survey link to various security organizations and asking for 
the leadership of each organization to send an invitation on the behalf of the researcher to 
participate in the study through a survey link, added to the anonymous nature of the 
study, including the option of not capturing IP addresses, through the Qualtrics platform. 
All survey responses were anonymous and voluntary, including the exclusion of IP 
address identifiers, and presented minimal risks.  The use of anonymity measures helped 
ensure there were no potential conflicts of interest.  Measures were taken to mask the 
names of the various organizations that participated in the study according to the Walden 
University IRB best practices.   
Summary of Design and Methodology 
The methodology chosen for this research study offered a framework for gaining 
some insights from a multidisciplinary sample of individuals from the private and public 
sectors that were familiar with cybersecurity related issues.  This study generated insights 
and knowledge for addressing the problem of criminal hacking globally and the potential 
to help in future studies to show how policies and laws should be crafted in the future. 
Through capturing the insights of individuals among the public and private sectors, and 
their networking connections, on their attitudes for the need of an international law for 




criminal hacking should be punished a foundation has been established that can be built 
upon.  The insights gained helped distinguish if there is a need for one international law 
addressing criminal hacking or if increased coordinative efforts toward addressing 
criminal hacking from a singular nation’s multinational coordinative approach is needed. 
Using the quantitative research design provided the generalizable scientific truth 
of what perceptions are held among various disciplines for the protection of the cyber 
realm, including those immersed in cybersecurity professions, law enforcement, 
academia, the legislative realm, to name a few.  Special attention was provided to the 
threats to validity and how to mitigate those threats through the structured quantitative 
research design.  Concerted efforts were put forth to help ensure all the ethical procedures 
involved for the participants in the study were covered using best standard practices of 
the official institutional IRB.  The deductive logic derived from the research questions 
garnered insight to be synthesized for helping to propel future decision-making processes 
nationally and internationally for the cybersecurity policy domain in addressing criminal 





Chapter 4: Results  
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative dissertation was to explore the relationship 
between individuals in the public and private sectors and their attitudes toward the need 
for one international law defining criminal hacking and the penalties associated with the 
acts of criminal hacking and to what extent the crime should be penalized.  The research 
questions were designed to gain insight from public and private sector individuals on 
their attitudes toward the need for an international law defining criminal hacking, the 
penalties associated with the acts of criminal hacking, and to what extent criminal 
hacking should be punished.  The independent variables of the study included age group, 
ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical hacking ability, and 
education; they were statistically measured with the dependent variables of the study and 
the groups of public and private sector entities, showing correlations for the questions of 
the study.  
The following provides the central research question and the three questions for 
the study: Is there a need for the definition of criminal hacking and the penalties 
associated with the act to be addressed under one international law? 
RQ1: Do age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical 
hacking ability, and education predict the attitudes toward the need for one international 
law for defining criminal hacking between public and private sector entities? 
H01: Age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical 




international law for defining criminal hacking between public and private sector 
individuals? 
H11: Age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical 
hacking ability, and education do predict the attitudes toward the need for one 
international law for defining criminal hacking between public and private sector 
individuals? 
RQ2: Do age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical 
hacking ability, and education predict the attitudes toward the need for the penalties of 
criminal hacking to be addressed under one international law between public and private 
sector individuals? 
H02: Age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical 
hacking ability, and education do not predict the attitudes toward the need for the 
penalties of criminal hacking to be addressed under one international law between 
public and private sector individuals? 
H12: Age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical 
hacking ability, and education do predict the attitudes toward the need for the 
penalties of criminal hacking to be addressed under one international law between 
public and private sector individuals? 
RQ3: Is there a difference among age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure 
sector affiliation, technical hacking ability, and education on the attitudes toward the 
extent criminal hacking, as defined from the example in the study, needs modification of 




H03: There is no difference among age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure 
sector affiliation, technical hacking ability, and education on the attitudes toward 
the extent criminal hacking, as defined from the examples in the study, needs 
modification of stricter or lesser penalties between public and private sector 
individuals? 
H13: There is a difference among age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure 
sector affiliation, technical hacking ability, and education on the attitudes toward 
the extent criminal hacking, as defined from the examples in the study, needs 
modification of stricter or lesser penalties between public and private sector 
individuals? 
Chapter 4 consists of the data collection details, descriptive statistics for the 
survey questions, and the results of the study.  The data collection details include the time 
frame for data collection and the rates for recruitment and response, descriptive and 
demographic characteristics of the sample, a description of how the sample related to the 
population of interest, and challenges in the recruitment process.  The results of the study 
provide descriptive statistics that characterized the sample, an evaluation of statistical 
assumptions, and statistical analyses findings with tables and figures illustrating the 
results. 
Data Collection 
Walden University approved the study on July 12, 2019. The approval number for 
this study is 07-16-19-0324940 and it expires on July 15, 2020.  The survey data were 




number of security organizations through an invitation sent on my behalf, LinkedIn 
responses to the posted study on LinkedIn, and six responses through the Walden 
University participant pool.  The response rates were minimally steady throughout the 
process, with some peaks in the response rates during the period likely because some 
respondents reposted the survey request on their LinkedIn platforms.  I assume the 
majority of the responses were from security organizations because response rates peaked 
when surveys were sent to those organizations’ memberships. 
The sample included various demographic characteristics according to those 
options provided in the survey questions, which included men and women; age group 
representations from 18 years and above; educational backgrounds; and originating 
ethnicities, which included Asian, African, American, Australian, Canadian, European 
Union, Hispanic or Latino, India National, Middle Eastern, Russian, and the option of 
other.  Additionally, the sample included employment in public or private sector; critical 
infrastructure most affiliated with, which included chemical sector, commercial facilities 
sector, communications sector, critical manufacturing sector, dams sector, defense 
industrial base sector, education sector, emergency services sector, energy sector, 
financial services sector, food and agriculture sector, government facilities sector, 
healthcare and public health sector, information technology sector, nuclear reactors 
materials and waste sector, transportation systems sector, water and wastewater systems 
sector, and the option of not being affiliated with any of the infrastructures provided 





Purposive total population nonprobability sampling was used for the study.  The 
sample studied represented a population of those affiliated with cybersecurity or security 
in general to varying degrees.  The population of interest represented only a portion of the 
larger population, providing for a representative sample, given the scope of the study, to 
gain the attitudes of individuals in the public and private sectors on international laws for 
criminal hacking.  The sample comprised of individual members of a number of security 
organizations, LinkedIn professional networks, and a small sample of six respondents 
from the Walden University participant pool.  Sibona and Walczak (2012) showed how 
using social networking sites for sample population, through nonprobability recruitment, 
can help in exploring newer ideas pertaining to technologies and different cultures.  It is 
unknown if external validity or generalizability can be applied to all groups outside the 
realm of cybersecurity or security in general.  Hard to reach populations, such as the 
criminal hacking realm, may have provided attitudes different from those represented in 
this study. 
The survey was administered according to the method planned for the sample 
population, which included requests from security-related organizations to send out a 
request to their membership on my behalf and LinkedIn networks comprising of those 
familiar with security.  Several organizations accepted the invitation to disseminate the 
survey, and a few declined due to policies in place to only disseminate the organization’s 
proprietary surveys to members.  Although the length of time to gain a sizable number of 





Challenges in gaining survey respondents could be due to the reasons some 
security professionals tend to not participate in surveys or questionnaires.  According to a 
study on privacy, Heikkila (2009) illustrated 30 responses to her open ended follow up 
question on why so few respond to security related questionnaires.  The following is a list 
of several of the responses (Heikkila, 2009, p. 91, Table 5):  
• “Because we don’t know who will have access to identifying information 
from the survey and we don’t want to advertise our vulnerabilities.” 
• “People get asked to fill out surveys every day.” 
• “Not enough time to respond to surveys.” 
• “Fear that the information will be used against them. Embarrassment. 
Ignorance on the subject. Many do not understand security and assume someone is taking 
care of it.” 
Results  
The descriptive statistics that characterized the sample for the study enabled for a 
clear picture to be gained from all the initial data inputs.  The following tables provide 
the demographics of the respondents in relation to employment sector affiliation (Table 
1) and for each of the ten individual survey questions answered (Tables 2-11).  
The following provides an example for reading the demographics table (Table 1). 
Of the nongovernmental organization group, 0.0% are 18 to 29 years of age, 18.8% are 
30 to 39 years of age, 31.3% are 40 to 49 years of age, 31.3% are 50 to 50 years of age, 
and 18.8% are 60 years of age and above, which totals 100% for the number of 





Frequency Counts on the Demographics of Respondents in Relation to the Groups of the 







Retired Unable  
to work 
Age group N = 226 
18–29 years 0.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
30–39 years 18.8 16.4 22.1 0.0 33.3 
40–49 years 31.3 29.1 36.8 0.0 33.3 
50–59 years 31.3 35.8 27.9 40.0 33.3 
60 years and above 18.8 13.4 13.2 60.0 0.0 
Ethnicity N = 226 
African 12.5 2.2 4.4 0.0 0.0 
American 43.8 64.2 67.6 40.0 66.7 
Asian 6.3 4.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Canadian 0.0 1.5 2.9 0.0 0.0 
EU 6.3 19.4 16.2 40.0 0.0 
Hispanic 12.5 0.7 1.5 0.0 0.0 
India National 0.0 0.7 1.5 0.0 0.0 
Middle Eastern 12.5 0.7 2.9 0.0 0.0 
Other 6.3 6.0 2.9 20.0 33.3 
Gender N = 225 
Female 25.0 24.6 23.9 20.0 100.0 
Male 75.0 75.4 76.1 80.0 0.0 
Infrastructure affiliation N = 225 
Chemical 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Commercial facilities 0.0 3.7 0.0 20.0 0.0 
Communications 0.0 0.7 2.9 0.0 0.0 
Critical manufacturing 0.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Defense industrial base 0.0 2.2 1.5 0.0 0.0 
Education 31.3 7.5 20.6 20.0 0.0 
Emergency services 0.0 0.7 4.4 0.0 0.0 
Energy 0.0 3.7 1.5 0.0 0.0 
Financial services 0.0 11.2 2.9 0.0 0.0 
Food and agriculture 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Government facilities 6.3 0.0 14.7 0.0 0.0 
Healthcare and public health 25.0 9.0 14.7 20.0 0.0 
Information and technologies 18.8 39.6 29.4 20.0 0.0 
Transportation 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other 18.8 9.7 7.4 20.0 0.0 
Technical hacking ability N = 224 
Yes 50.0 47.8 47.8 25.0 0.0 
No  50.0 52.2 52.2 75.0 100.0 
Education N = 225 
Diploma or equivalent 6.3 4.5 1.5 0.0 0.0 
Trade/technical training or college degree 37.5 53.4 52.9 60.0 66.7 
Master’s degree or higher 56.3 42.1 45.6 40.0 33.3 





For Survey Q1 (see Appendix B) there were 226 respondents who chose to answer the 
question out of 228 total survey responses, and two who chose not to answer the question 
on age group.  Of the 226 responses, 7 (3.1 %) responded in the 18-29 age bracket, 41 
(18.1%) responded in the 30-39 age bracket, 70 (31%) responded in the 40 – 49 age 
bracket, 75 (33.2%) responded in the 50-59 age bracket, and 33 (14.6%) responded in the 
60 years and above age bracket. The table shows the majority of the respondents fall 




Frequency Counts for Independent Ratio Scale Variable: Age Group 
Age group   n   % % of Data: confidence interval 
18 to 29 years  7   3.1  1.9 to 4.9 
30 to 39 years  41   18.1 15.1 to 21.7  
40 to 49 years  70  31.0 27.2 to 35.0 
50 to 59 years  75  33.2 29.3 to 37.3 
60 years and 
above 
 33  14.6 11.8 to 17.9 
Note. N = 226. 
 
For Survey Q2 (see Appendix B) there were 226 respondents who chose to answer 
the question out of 228 total survey responses, and two that chose not to answer the 
question on ethnicity.  Of the 226 responses, 8 (3.5 %) responded to African descent, 143 
(63.3%) responded to American descent, 7 (3.1%) responded to Asian descent, 4 (1.8%) 
responded to Canadian descent, 40 (17.7%) responded to European Union descent, 4 




descent, 5 (2.2%) responded to Middle Eastern descent, and 13 (5.8%) responded to 
other.  The table shows the majority of respondents are from American descent (Table 3). 
Table 3 
 
Frequency Counts for Independent Nominal Variable: Ethnicity 
Ethnicity   n  % % of Data: 
confidence interval 
African   8  3.5  2.3 to 5.5 
American  143  63.3 59.1 to 67.3 
Asian  7  3.1  1.9 to 4.9 
Canadian  4  1.8  0.9 to 3.3 
EU  40  17.7 14.7 to 21.2 
Hispanic  
India National  
 4 
 2  
 1.8 
 0.88  
 0.9 to 3.3 







 1.3 to 3.9 
 4.1 to 8.1 
    
Note. N = 226. 
 
For Survey Q3 (see Appendix B) there were 225 respondents who chose to answer 
the question out of 228 total survey responses, and three that chose not to answer the 
question on gender.  Of the 225 responses, 168 (74.7 %) responded to being male and 57 
(25.3%) responded to being female.  The table shows nearly 3/4 of the survey 
respondents were male (Table 4). 
Table 4 
 
Frequency Counts for Independent Dichotomous Variable: Gender 




 168  
 57  
 74.7 
 25.3 
70.8 to 78.2 
21.8 to 29.2 





For Survey Q4 (see Appendix B) there were 225 respondents who chose to answer 
the question out of 228 total survey responses, and three that chose not to answer the 
question on infrastructure affiliation.  Of the 225 responses, 2 (0.88 %) responded being 
affiliated with the chemical sector, 6 (2.7%) responded to being affiliated with the 
commercial facilities sector, 3 (1.3%) responded to being affiliated with the 
communications sector, 7 (3.1%) responded to being affiliated with the critical 
manufacturing sector, 4 (1.8%) responded to being affiliated with defense industrial base 
sector, 30 (13.3%) responded to being affiliated with the education sector, 4 (1.8%) 
responded to being affiliated with the emergency services sector, 6 (2.7%) responded to 
being affiliated with the energy sector, 17 (7.5%) responded to being affiliated with the 
financial services sector, 4 (1.8%) responded to being affiliated with the food and 
agriculture sector, 11 (4.9%) responded to being affiliated with the government facilities 
sector, 27 (11.9%) responded to being affiliated with the healthcare and public health 
sector, 77 (34.1%) responded to being affiliated with the information technology sector, 3 
(1.3%) responded to being a part of the transportation sector, and 25 (11.1%) responded 
to other, or not being affiliated with any of the infrastructure sectors provided (Table 5). 
Table 5 
 
Frequency Counts for Independent Nominal Variable: Infrastructure Sector Affiliation 
Infrastructure sector 
affiliation 
n % % of Data:  
confidence interval  
Chemical  2 0.88  0.4 to 2.1 
Commercial facilities  6 2.7  1.6 to 4.4 
Communications  3 1.3  0.6 to 2.7 
Critical manufacturing  7 3.1  1.9 to4.9 




Education 30 13.3 10.6 to 16.4 
Emergency services   4   1.8   0.9 to 3.3 
Energy   6   2.7   1.6 to 4.4 
Financial services 17   7.5   5.6 to 10.1 
Food and agriculture    4   1.8   0.9 to 3.3 
Government facilities  11     4.9   3.3 to 7.0 
Healthcare and public 
health 
 27   11.9   9.5 to 15.0 
Information and 
technologies 
 77   34.1  30.2 to 38.2 
Transportation   3     1.3   0.6 to 2.7 
Other     25   11.1   8.7 to 14.0 
Note. N = 225 
For Survey Q5 (see Appendix B) there were 224 respondents who chose to answer 
the question out of 228 total survey responses, and four chose not to answer the question 
on technical hacking ability.  Of the 224 responses, 105 (46.9 %) responded to having 
technical hacking ability, and 119 (53.1%) responded to not having technical hacking 
skills.  The table shows nearly an even distribution of technical hacking ability and no 
technical hacking skills among the survey respondents (Table 6). 
Table 6 
 
Frequency Counts for Independent Dichotomous Variable: Technical Hacking Ability 
Technical 
hacking ability  













42.6 to 51.2 
 
48.8 to 57.4 





For Survey Q6 (see Appendix B) there were 225 respondents that chose to answer 
the question out of 228 total survey responses, and two who chose not to answer the 
question on education.  Of the 225 responses, 8 (3.6 %) responded to having a high 
school graduate degree or equivalent, 99 (44.0%) responded to having a Master’s degree 
or higher, and 118 (52.4%) responded to having trade or technical training or a college 
degree. The table shows 96.4 % of the respondents achieved education outside of the high 
school graduate level (Table 7). 
Table 7 
 
Frequency Counts for Independent Nominal Variable: Education 




















 44.0  
 
 52.4 
2.3 to 5.5 
 
 
39.8 to 48.3 
 
48.2 to 56.7 
Note. N = 225. 
 
For Survey Q7 (see Appendix B), 226 respondents chose to answer the question 
out of 228 total survey responses, and two chose not to answer the question on 
employment sector.  Of the 226 responses, 134 (59.3 %) responded to being a part of the 
private sector, 68 (30.1%) responded to being a part of the public sector, 16 (7.1%) 




responded to being retired, and 3 (1.3%) responded to being unable to work.  Nearly 2/3 
of the respondents are from the private sector (Table 8). 
Table 8 
 






















55.1 to 63.4 
26.3 to 34.1 
5.2 to 9.6 
1.3 to 3.9 
0.6 to 2.7 
Note. N = 226. 
 
For Survey Q8 (see Appendix B) there were 224 respondents who chose to answer 
the question, out of 228 total survey responses, and four chose not to answer the question. 
Research Question 1: On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how would you rate 
your attitude toward the need for one international law for defining criminal hacking (See 
Appendix B, Survey Q8)? 
Of the 224 responses, 104 (46.4 %) responded strongly agree, 80 (35.7%) 
responded somewhat agree, 14 (6.3%) responded to neither agree nor disagree, 14 (6.3%) 
responded to somewhat disagree, 12 (5.4%) responded to strongly disagree (Table 9). 
Table 9 
 
Frequency Counts for Dependent Variable: Research Question 1, Likert Scale 
RQ1   n   %  % of Data: 
confidence 
interval  























31.7 to 39.9 
 4.5 to 8.7 
 
 4.5 to 8.7 
 
 3.7 to 7.6 
Note. N = 224.  
 
Numerical coding of RQ1 in Stats iQ allowed for the following descriptive 
statistics for the dependent variable Likert scale evaluation of Survey Q8 (Table 10). 
Table 10 
 
Numerically Coded Dependent Variable: Survey Question 8 - Likert Scale 
Sample  
size 





 Min Max Sum 
224 2.0 1.88 1.74 – 2.03 1.12  1.0 5.0 422 
 
For Survey Q9 (see Appendix B) there were 226 respondents who chose to answer 
the question, out of 228 total survey responses, and two chose not to answer the question. 
Research Question 2: On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how you would rate 
your attitude toward the need for the penalties of criminal hacking to be addressed under 
one international law (see Appendix B, Survey Q9)? 
Of the 226 responses, 102 (45.1 %) responded strongly agree, 80 (35.4%) 
responded somewhat agree, 14 (6.2%) responded to neither agree nor disagree, 15 (6.6%) 






Frequency Counts for Dependent Variable: Research Question 2 - Likert Scale 












   80 
   14 
  
   15 
  
   15 
 45.1 
 35.4 
   6.2 
  
   6.6 
  
   6.6 
40.9 to 49.4 
31.4 to 39.6 
 4.4 to 8.6 
  
 4.8 to 9.1 
 
 4.8 to 9.1 
 
Note. N = 226.  
 
Numerical coding of RQ1 in Stats iQ allowed for the following descriptive 
statistics for the dependent variable Likert scale evaluation of Survey Q9 (Table 12). 
Table 12 
 
Numerically Coded Dependent Variable: Survey Question 9 - Likert Scale 
Sample  
size 





 Min Max Sum 
226 2.0 1.94 1.79 – 2.10 1.17  1.0 5.0 439 
 
For Survey Q10 (see Appendix B) there were 225 respondents who chose to 
answer the question out of 228 total survey responses, and three chose not to answer the 
question.  
Research Question 3: On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how you would rate 




be implemented globally?  Use the example of the United States Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (CFAA) penalties chart (see Appendix B, Survey Q10). 
Of the 225 responses, 4 (1.8 %) responded no penalties, 7 (3.1%) responded 
minimal to less than moderate penalties, 61 (27.1%) responded to moderate penalties, 98 
(43.6%) responded to more than moderate penalties, and 55 (24.4%) responded to the 
harshest of penalties (Table 13). 
Table 13 
 
Frequency Counts for Dependent Variable: Research Question 3 - Likert Scale 


































 .9 to 3.3 
1.9 to 5.0 
 
 
23.5 to 31.1 
  
39.4 to 47 
 
 
21.0 to 28.3 
Note. N = 225.  
 
Numerical coding of RQ1 in Stats iQ allowed for the following descriptive 
statistics for the dependent variables of survey questions 10 through 12 Likert scale 






Numerically Coded Dependent Variable: Survey Question 8 - Likert Scale 
Sample  
Size 





 Min Max Sum 
224 2.0 1.88 1.74 – 2.03 1.12 1.0 5.0 422 
Note. Code 1 = strongly agree. Code 2 = somewhat agree. Code 3 = neither agree nor 




Numerically Coded Dependent Variable: Survey Question 9 - Likert Scale 
Sample  
Size 





  Min Max Sum 
226 2.0 1.94 1.79 – 2.10 1.17  1.0 5.0 439 
Note. Code 1 = strongly agree. Code 2 = somewhat agree. Code 3 = neither agree nor 




Numerically Coded Dependent Variable: Survey Question 10 - Likert Scale 
Sample  
Size 





 Min Max Sum 
225 4.0 3.86 3.74 – 3.97 0.89  1.0 5.0 868 
Note. Code 1 = no penalties. Code 2 = minimal to less than moderate penalties. Code 3 = 
moderate penalties. Code 4 = more than moderate penalties. Code 5 = harshest of 
penalties. 
 
The statistical platform used for the study was Stats iQ, a part of the Qualtrics 
platform.  There are four options in Stats iQ for data analysis, which include describe, 
relate, regression, and pivot table.  The artificial intelligence (AI) of the Stats iQ platform 
automatically defaults to the test with the least assumptions, given there is an option 




show relationships between two variables and Games-Howell tests to show if there are 
higher values in pairs of groups or others (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). In ranked correlation 
Stats iQ uses Spearman’s Rho when assumptions are violated by implementing rank-
transformation (Qualtrics, Provo, UT).  “Rank transformation is a well-established 
method for protecting against assumption violation (a “nonparametric” method), and the 
rank transformation from Pearson to Spearman is the most common” (Conover and Iman, 
1981, as cited by Qualtrics, Provo, UT).  Pearson’s r is used for Likert scale analysis, in 
that they are measured as they are continuous instead of ordinal, which is commonly 
done in the social science realm (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). 
Chi-square statistical analysis was used on the respondent data to find correlations 
among the data points, which included the aforementioned statistical tests with the AI 
Stats iQ platform.  The statistical assumption for analysis using chi-square is “there has to 
be at least five observations in each cell of the 2X2 table associated with the analysis 
(scalelive.com).”  A Fisher’s Exact Test is used when the aforementioned is not fulfilled 
(scalelive.com). The primary inference with Chi-square is 95% confidence level and 
unadjusted odds ratio (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). 
Summary of Survey Q8: On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how would you 
rate your attitude toward the need for one international law for defining criminal 
hacking? 
The results of the chi-square analysis revealed a non-significant association 
relationship between Survey Q7: Employment Sector - Please specify the employment 




1 to 5 please indicate how would you rate your attitude toward the need for one 
international law for defining criminal hacking?  
The analysis also showed no statistical significance with the independent 
variables of age group, ethnicity, gender, hacking ability, and education.  Additionally, 
the relationship between Survey Q7: Employment Sector and Survey Q4: Infrastructure 
Sector showed there is a strong statistically significant relationship (Table 17). The 
following cells were statistically significant (Table 18): 
• Of those that responded in the Private Sector group, 5.2% are in the 
Critical Manufacturing Sector group. The 95% Confidence interval is 2.6% to 10.4%. 
• Of those that responded in the Public Sector group, 20.6% are in the 
Education Sector group. The 95% confidence interval is 12.7% to 31.6%. 
• Of those that responded in the Non-Governmental Organization group, 
31.3% are in the Education Sector group. The 95% Confidence interval is 14.2% to 
55.6%. 
• Of those that responded in the Private Sector group, 36.6% are in the 
Information Technology group. The 95% Confidence interval is 31.7 to 48.0%. 
Table 17 
 




































Chemical        0.0% 1.5%  0.0%   0.0% 
Commercial facilities        0.0% 3.7%  0.0% 20.0% 
Communications        0.0% 0.75%  2.9%   0.0% 
Critical manufacturing        0.0%  5.2%  0.0%   0.0% 
Defense industrial base        0.0%  2.2%  1.5%   0.0% 
Education       31.3%  7.5% 20.6% 20.0% 
Emergency services        0.0%  0.75%   4.4%   0.0% 
Energy        0.0%  3.7%   1.5%   0.0% 
Financial services        0.0% 11.2%   2.9%   0.0% 
Food and agriculture        0.0%  3.0%   0.0%   0.0% 
Government facilities        6.3%  0.0% 14.7%   0.0% 
Healthcare and public 
health 
     25.0%  9.0% 14.7% 20.0% 
Information and 
technologies 
     18.8% 39.6% 29.4% 20.0% 
Transportation        0.0%   2.2%   0.0%   0.0% 
Other         18.8%   9.7%   7.4% 20.0% 
 
Using a 95% confidence level, the results of the chi-square analyses revealed no 
significant associations between the groups of the study (Public Sector, Private Sector, 
and Non-Governmental Organizations) and the independent and dependent variables of 
age group, ethnicity, gender, hacking ability, education, and Survey Q8: On a scale from 
1 to 5 please indicate how would you rate your attitude toward the need for one 
international law for defining criminal hacking?  The chi-square statistical results: X² (16, 




of the employment sector and the dependent variable, RQ1 and Survey Q8 of the study; 
therefore, I concluded the H01 cannot be rejected (Tables 19 & 20). 
Table 19 
 
Chi-square Test on Employment Sector (Survey Q7) and RQ1 (Survey Q8) 










  0.322249 
 
0.32753 




Chi-squared Results  
Chi square 18.0 
Degrees of freedom 16 
 
Summary of Survey Q9: On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how you would 
rate your attitude toward the need for the penalties of criminal hacking to be addressed 
under one international law? 
Using a 95% confidence level, the data analysis showed no statistically significant 
relationship between Survey Q7: Employment Sector - Please specify the employment 
sector you are most closely aligned with, and Survey Q9: On a scale from 1 to 5 please 
indicate how you would rate your attitude toward the need for the penalties of criminal 




The analysis also showed no statistical significance among the groups of the study 
and the independent variables of age group, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure affiliation, 
hacking ability, education.  The chi-square statistical results for the group of employment 
sector and RQ2: X² (16, N = 226) = 12.6, p = .70. There is no statistically significant 
association between the groups of the employment sector and dependent variable, RQ2 
and Survey Q9 of the study; therefore, I concluded the H02 cannot be rejected for RQ2. 
(Tables 21 & 22). 
Table 21 
 




















Chi-squared Results  
Chi square 12.6 
Degrees of freedom 16 
 
Summary of Survey Q10: On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how you would 




would be implemented globally?  See the United States Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
(CFAA) penalties chart (see Appendix B) 
Using a 95% confidence level, the data analysis showed no statistically significant 
relationship between Q7: Employment Sector - Please specify the employment sector you 
are most closely aligned with, and Q10: On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how you 
would rate your attitude toward the need for the penalties of criminal hacking to be 
addressed under one international law (Tables 23 & 24)?  
The analysis also showed no statistical significance among the groups of the study 
and the independent variables of age group, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure affiliation, 
hacking ability, education.  The chi-square statistical results for the group of employment 
sector and RQ3: X² (16, N = 225) = 21.9, p = .147.  There is no statistically significant 
association between the groups of the employment sector and dependent variable, RQ3 
and Survey Q10 of the study; therefore, I concluded the H03 cannot be rejected for RQ3.  
Table 23 
 





























Chi-squared Results  
Chi square 21.9 
Degrees of freedom 16 
 
Interestingly, the data analyses provided additional statistical correlation among 
the independent and dependent variables of the study showing varying degrees of 
significant relationships from the respondent’s survey data.  The following tables 
provided the results of the chi-square analyses using a 95% confidence level. 
There is a statistically significant relationship between Survey Q1: Age Group and 
Survey Q8: On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how would you rate your attitude 
toward the need for one international law for defining criminal hacking?  The chi-square 
statistical results for age group and Q8: X² (16, N = 224) = 28.1, p = .0308  
The chi-square statistical analyses and a pivot table showing the descriptive 
statistics are provided (Tables 25-27). 
Table 25 
 























Chi-squared Results  
Chi square 28.1 




Pivot Table for Age Group (Survey Q1) and RQ1 (Survey Q8) 











18 to 29 
30 to 39  
40 to 49 
50 to 59 

































There is a strong statistically significant relationship between Survey Q4: 
Infrastructure Sector Affiliation and Survey Q10: On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate 
how you would rate your inclination on the extent that criminal hacking should be 
penalized, given it would be implemented globally?  The chi-square statistical results for 
infrastructure affiliation and RQ3: X² (56, N = 225) = 84.2, p = .00882 
The chi-square statistical analyses and a pivot table showing the descriptive 





























Chi-squared Results  
Chi square 84.2  






















    
Chemical 1.8% 1.0%   0.0%   0.0% 0.0%     
Commercial 
facilities 
3.6% 2.0%   1.6% 14.3% 0.0%     
Communications 1.8% 2.0%   0.0%   0.0% 0.0%     
Critical 
manufacturing 
3.6%  1.0%   6.6%   0.0% 0.0%     
Defense 
industrial base 
1.8%  0.0%   3.3%   0.0% 25.0%     
Education 7.3% 20.4%   4.9% 42.9%  0.0%     
Emergency 
services 
7.3%   0.0%   0.0%   0.0%  0.0%     




Financial services 10.9%   5.1%   6.6%   0.0% 50.0%     
Food and 
agriculture 





   9.2%    1.6%   0.0%   0.0%     
Healthcare and 
public health 
10.9%    8.2%   21.3%   0.0%   0.0%     
Information and 
technologies 
29.1%   33.7%   39.3% 42.9%  25.0%     
Transportation  0.0%     1.0%     3.3%   0.0%   0.0%     
Other    14.5%   11.2%     8.2%   0.0%   0.0%     
Total                      100.0%         100%           100%         100%          100%         
 
There is a statistically significant relationship between Survey Q1: Age Group and 
Survey Q10: On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how you would rate your inclination 
on the extent that criminal hacking should be penalized, given it would be implemented 
globally? The chi-square statistical results for age group and RQ3: X² (16, N = 225) = 
32.1, p = .00968 
The chi-square statistical analysis and a pivot table showing the descriptive 
statistics are provided (Tables 31-33). 
Table 31 
 


























Chi-squared Results  
Chi square 32.1 




Pivot Table for Age Group (Survey Q1) and RQ3 (Survey Q10) 












18 to 29 
30 to 39  
40 to 49 
50 to 59 

































There is a statistically significant relationship between Survey Q5: Technical 
Hacking Ability and Survey Q10: On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how you would 
rate your inclination on the extent that criminal hacking should be penalized, given it 
would be implemented globally?  The chi-square statistical results for technical hacking 
ability and RQ3: X² (4, N = 223) = 24.7, p = .0000583 
The chi-square statistical analysis and a pivot table showing the descriptive 
































Chi-squared Results  
Chi square 24.7 


































































There is a subtle but statistically significant relationship between Survey Q3: 
Gender and Survey Q8: On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how would you rate your 
attitude toward the need for one international law for defining criminal hacking?  The 
chi-square statistical results for the gender and RQ1: X² (4, N = 225) = 12.2, p = .0158 
The chi-square statistical analysis and a pivot table showing the descriptive 
statistics are provided (Tables 37-39). 
Table 37 
 

























Chi-squared Results  
Chi square 12.2  






































In this study I explored the relationships between the group of employment sector 
individuals, independent variables of age, ethnicity, gender, critical infrastructure 
affiliation, technical hacking ability, education level, and the dependent variables, which 
included the attitudes toward an international law for defining criminal hacking, the 
attitudes toward the need for the penalties of criminal hacking to be addressed under one 
international law, and the attitudes toward the extent that criminal hacking should be 
penalized, given it would be implemented globally. 
The following research questions for the study were statistically analyzed, 
revealing no significant association between the groups of employment sector individuals 
and the independent and dependent variables of the study.  RQ1: Do age groups, 
ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical hacking ability, and education 
predict the attitudes toward the need for one international law for defining criminal 
hacking between public and private sector entities?, RQ2: Do age groups, ethnicity, 
gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical hacking ability, and education predict 




one international law between public and private sector individuals?, and RQ3: Is there a 
difference among age groups, ethnicity, gender, infrastructure sector affiliation, technical 
hacking ability, and education on the attitudes toward the extent criminal hacking, as 
defined from the example in the study, needs modification of stricter or lesser penalties 
between public and private sector individuals? 
The analysis from the chi-square tests showed no significant differences in the 
mean of the employment sector groups, which included public and private sector 
individuals, and the mean of the independent and dependent variables of the study.  The 
null hypotheses for RQ1, RQ2, and RQ3 were statistically tested using a 95% confidence 
interval.  Concerted efforts were taken to help ensure the correct inferences were gained 
and there were no type I or type II errors.  The assumptions for the hypotheses testing 
included the level of measurement of the variables, the sampling method, the shape of the 
population distribution, and the sample size.  
Although, there were no statistical significance among the research questions for 
the study, some statistical significance was found from analyzing the independent and 
dependents variables of the study, without the group of employment sector as the primary 
independent variable.  The findings from these data analyses included: there is a 
statistical significance in age group and the attitudes toward the need for one international 
law for defining criminal hacking (RQ1), there is a statistical significance in age group 
and the attitudes toward the extent criminal hacking, as defined from the example in the 
study needs modification of stricter or lesser penalties (RQ3), there is a statistical 




defining criminal hacking (RQ1), there is a statistical significance in infrastructure 
affiliation and the attitudes toward the extent criminal hacking, as defined from the 
example in the study (RQ3), and there is a statistical significance in hacking ability and 
the attitudes toward the extent criminal hacking, as defined from the example in the 
study, needs modification of stricter or lesser penalties (RQ3). 
Through the data analyses, these data demonstrated the need for an international 
law for defining criminal hacking and the penalties associated with the crime, as well as 
to what extent the crime should be penalized, according to what is put forth and described 
in the United States CFAA, as an example for capturing respondent attitudes of lesser or 
more strict penalties.  The theoretical approach used in the study illustrated how role 
theory and empathy have a connection in propelling effective policy employment for the 
future of criminal hacking laws at the international level.  Chapter 5 concludes the study 





Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative dissertation was to explore the relationship 
between individuals in the public and private sectors and their attitudes toward the need 
for one international law defining criminal hacking and the penalties associated with the 
act.  The threat landscape in the virtual realm continues to escalate, leaving paths of 
destruction.  The privacy and security of individuals, businesses, and global communities 
are suffering from the damages caused by criminal hacking. 
I conducted this study hoping to find a relationship among the groups of the 
employment sectors, which included public and private sector individuals, and their 
attitudes on the need for an international law defining criminal hacking, attitudes toward 
the need for penalties for criminal hacking under one international law, and attitudes 
toward the extent criminal hacking, as defined from the example in the study, needs 
modification of stricter or lesser penalties. I hope this study will help propel solutions for 
answering and addressing these questions.  
Summary of Key Findings  
There were no significant associations between the groups of employment sector 
individuals and the independent and dependent variables of the study.  Although there 
were no significant findings for the precise research questions of the study, there were 
findings of statistical significance found from analyzing the independent and dependent 
variables.  Without the group of employment sector as the primary independent variable, 




infrastructure affiliation, gender, and hacking ability, and the dependent variables served 
the questions of the study.  
The findings from these data analyses included the following statistical 
correlations.  There is a statistical significance in age group and attitudes toward the need 
for one international law defining criminal hacking (Tables 22 and 23).  There is a 
statistical significance in age group and attitudes toward the extent criminal hacking, as 
defined in the study, needs modification of stricter or lesser penalties (Tables 26 and 27). 
There is a subtle, but statistical, significance in gender and the attitudes toward the need 
for one international law defining criminal hacking (Tables 30 and 31).  There is a strong 
statistical significance in infrastructure affiliation and attitudes toward the extent criminal 
hacking, as defined in the study, needs modification of stricter or lesser penalties (Tables 
24 and 25).  Lastly, there is a statistical significance in hacking ability and attitudes 
toward the extent criminal hacking, as defined in the study, needs modification of stricter 
or lesser penalties (Tables 28 and 29). 
In retrospect, my study could have focused on fewer variables and eliminated 
employment sector as the overarching variable to be statistically analyzed among the 
independent and dependent variables.  If the focus of the independent variable of groups, 
which included public sector and private sector individuals, was eliminated and the study 
proceeded with the remaining variables, the study would have shown statistically 
significant results and the null hypotheses for RQ3 would have been rejected and the 
alternative hypothesis accepted, showing a difference among age groups, ethnicity, 




attitudes toward the extent criminal hacking, as defined from the examples in the study, 
needs modification of stricter or lesser penalties.  The preceding alternative hypothesis 
excluded the groups of public and private sector individuals, as depicted in the study, as 
an example. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
The findings of my study align with the need to help curtail the damage being 
done on a global scale from activities of criminal hacking through the overwhelming 
responses toward the need to have more than moderate penalties for criminal hacking 
(Table 13).  Bartholomae (2017) illustrated, through a network model comprising of a 
cloud service provider, consumers of the cloud service provider, and one who penetrates 
the cloud network to gain information, that global policy is needed to deter hacking by 
imposing higher fines.  This can be applicable to the general consensus of the study for 
the penalties associated with criminal hacking.  The survey responses, weighing more 
toward the attitude that the penalties for criminal hacking should be more than what are 
presently in place in the United States.  The international community has made some 
gains since the 2001 treaty on cybercrime was implemented, although much more work is 
needed (Bartholomae, 2017). 
Similarly, Visher and Weisburd (1998) expounded on how there needs to be 
tailored approaches for crime prevention strategies to help ensure recidivism rates 
decrease and are potentially alleviated.  These approaches should involve efforts among 
stakeholders in establishing and implementing unique programs with precise elements for 




hacking through a government role approach, while embodying empathy in the processes, 
governments, businesses, and organizations, as well as individuals, globally can reap the 
benefits of a stable global cyber realm.  With leaders worldwide taking a holistic 
approach in using a lens that captures the threat landscape, privacy and security, and 
effective policies and laws, international legislative bodies can move forward collectively 
in helping to decrease criminal hacking levels. 
The findings in this study confirm a need for policies to be addressed at the 
international level (Tables 9 and 11). Trotta (2017) elucidated the need for expert 
technocrat knowledge and the knowledge of the citizenry to help enhance policy efforts. 
The opinions of multidisciplinary experts and the population as a whole would greatly 
benefit from efforts being put forth in addressing criminal hacking policy solutions; 
everybody is being affected by the devastations created globally from criminal hacking. 
If these additional objectives were adopted as best practices and promulgated within the 
legislative realm around the world, there could be an increase in the rate at which critical 
policy issues are addressed in general. 
Limitations of the Study 
There were some limitations and a delimitation to my study.  One limitation 
included a lack of previous studies in the research topic area, which made it harder to find 
studies that would provide meaning to the concepts of my study. Although the virtual 
realm has existed for decades, there have been few studies on the policy issues involving 
criminal hacking.  This element presented challenges for building on the research of other 




security, privacy, policy, and laws, which were addressed in Chapter 2.  Other limitations 
of the study, which are common for many research studies, were time and monetary 
resources.  With unlimited time and money, the aims, goals, and outcomes of the study 
would have produced additional insights through the potential of a larger global sample 
size, providing additional data to be analyzed.  
The data collection method could have been improved with more experience in 
collecting primary data.  Experience in data collection may have helped in alleviating the 
additional amount of time involved in conducting the research study.  Additionally, 
experience in data collection may have helped me bring in a larger sample size in a 
shorter amount of time, which would have potentially generated additional correlations or 
results for the study.  
A delimitation of my study can be seen through too narrow of a research aim for 
the groups of the study, involving employment sectors, as the main focus of the study in 
relation to the independent variables and the dependent variables.  This more narrowed 
approach eliminated the opportunity to gain statistical significance in other areas between 
the independent and dependent variables of the study.  Fewer independent variables, 
while broadening the focus of the study in eliminating the primary independent variable 
of employment sector groups, would have allowed for the main focus of the study to be 
on examining the relationships between fewer independent variables and the dependent 




Recommendations and Future Studies 
Criminal hacking touches numerous entities worldwide from individuals, 
companies, organizations, and governments, to name a few.  A theme I uncovered, 
throughout the research process, is how prevalent hacking is internationally.  There has 
been a rise in information warfare, stated Lei (2019), which involves gaining an 
advantage from the use of information.  The use of information to gain an advantage has 
been taking place globally, with a few countries being noted on the news front as being 
more active in this area. The U.S. Justice Department indicted four Chinese hackers in 
the Equifax breach in February 2020 (Dufner, 2020).  It is unknown if there will be any 
resolutions from these indictments.  Marks (2019) suggested that hackers of North Korea 
have been using information warfare technics, although their acts are seen by many as 
acts of espionage, rather than criminal hacking acts.  With no clear definition for criminal 
hacking, gray areas pertaining to criminal hacking and information warfare continue to be 
an issue in the policy realm, with a great deal of work yet to be done in establishing a 
framework that clearly addresses criminal hacking holistically.  
Scharf and Taylor (2017) showed how the crime of piracy, an international crime 
over two hundred years old, could offer some new perspectives on addressing similar 
issues in modern day societies.  It has been suggested we look at the international laws of 
piracy for building a coordinative framework for addressing cybersecurity related issues 
in relation to computer intrusions (Lei, 2019; Shackelford, 2017a).  Scholars could study 
the viability of using an existing international framework, under international law and 




Additional insights could be gained from the hacking culture today, toward policy 
solutions in the criminal hacking realm, through future scholarly studies anonymously 
involving todays, more transparent, technological hackers and whether age group, 
ethnicity, and gender plays a part in differentiating opinions.  Hiltner, a reporter for the 
Surfacing column (September 2018), showed how some anonymity and privacy 
perceptions are moving in a different direction from what was once considered to be the 
norm of only using aliases, which can be seen through interactions from hacker 
conferences, such as the annual hacking conference held in Las Vegas, Nevada, Defcon. 
Hiltner illustrated how the pressures involving demands by the private and public sectors 
for experts in the cybersecurity field and bug bounty programs, propelled by professional 
entities and the gamification arena, have shown a present day need for various aspects of 
the hacking culture (Hiltner, 2018).  
Similar to my study, I recommend future studies, which could offer additional 
insights for addressing policy issues in the criminal hacking realm and if there should be 
policies at the international level, solely studying the attitudes of technological hackers. 
These future studies, addressing the attitudes of those with technological hacking skills 
and if their attitudes reveal there is a need for international laws addressing criminal 
hacking, could provide policy solutions that have not yet been considered.  The 
information gained by these future studies could be used by international legislative 





Political culture in relation to an international framework addressing criminal 
hacking could pose as a future study involving a sample of the legislative population in a 
number of countries.  The study could offer a great deal of insight as to how international 
communities should move forward in holistically addressing criminal hacking and if one 
international law is feasible, providing the vast differences in political cultures around the 
world.  This study could also be used in concert with meta-analysis for studying various 
populations around the world and their attitudes on an international framework for 
criminal hacking. Singh (2007) showed how meta-analysis is used to find patterns from 
multiple studies, using a number of statistical tests, to help in solving research problems. 
Scholars could gain additional insights from future studies involving global 
government leaders on if there is a need for an international law for defining criminal 
hacking, policies associated with criminal hacking, and what penalties should be 
attributed for committing the crime.  The results of this future study potentially could add 
to the findings of my study and other studies, in the criminal hacking realm, for 
determining if there are additional outliers that should be considered for the development 
of international laws and policies, in general, for addressing criminal hacking policies 
among international communities.  A multidisciplinary approach in gaining insights from 
future studies for international policy development in the criminal hacking realm should 
help escalate potential policy solutions for addressing universal criminal hacking policy 
issues. 
Finally, a future study, limited to a few independent variables, without the 




from a larger global sample could be analyzed to see if there is a significance among the 
variables of the study and the attitudes toward the penalties of criminal hacking and 
international laws.  Promoting future scholarly studies in the realm of criminal hacking 
and policy development will help ensure there are ample amounts of data to sift through 
in efforts to find beneficial correlations that could have a positive impact on the trajectory 
of future laws for criminal hacking.  
Implications 
There are some implications for positive social change in the policy realm, which 
would ultimately have an impact on every member of the global society, as a whole. 
Callahan et al. (2012) illustrated a multifaceted framework that Walden University has 
used for a number of social change initiatives stemming from the Walden University 
community of alumni, faculty members, and students.  The framework included a number 
of features that potentially could be webbed together to provide a holistic approach to 
addressing positive social change in a number of areas among our global communities. 
The framework consists of eight features that involve collaboration, advocacy, practice, 
civic engagement, humane ethics, systematic thinking, scholarship, and reflection 
(Callahan et al., 2012).  
The elemental framework Callahan et al. (2012) depicted would work very well in 
promoting future studies in the realm of cybersecurity and ultimately providing for a 
holistic policy development approach for defining criminal hacking internationally, and 
the penalties that should be associated with the crime.  The pieces of collaboration and 




levels of government for addressing criminal hacking and advocacy is needed in attempts 
to propel the policy initiatives.  Scholarship, systematic thinking, civic engagement, and 
practice, additional pieces of the Callahan et al. (2012) framework, culminate into a 
practitioner’s model that could be used to further the initiatives already in place in the 
cybersecurity realm, for holistically using a team approach that embodies the great minds 
of today for actively solving the modern-day issues of criminal hacking and effective 
policy implementation.  Finally, the key elements described, as well as the additional 
elements of humane ethics and reflection, from the features of the Callahan et al. (2012) 
framework, are needed to fully capture a holistic approach for addressing the needs of 
humanity in the ever evolving threat landscape of criminal hacking, including the culture 
that brings these criminal acts to fruition.  
Building a framework consisting of agreements, rules, and laws among 
international bodies is paramount in protecting societies and today and in the future from 
the adverse and damaging effects of criminal hacking.  Concerted efforts among technical 
experts, including the hacking community, and the legislative realm will help propel 
policy solutions for criminal hacking.  An awareness approach, as to the hazards of 
criminal hacking, could bring forth even more concerted efforts on a multidisciplinary 
plane for finding answers to the policy issues we face today.  Dissuading the criminal 
hacking culture could pose as an additional approach in moving forward toward a policy 





In summary, the examination of the attitudes of individuals, across the public and 
private employment sectors, provided a general consensus, according to 82 percent of 
survey respondents, on the need for an international law for defining criminal hacking, 
the need for an international law for criminal hacking, according to 80 percent of survey 
respondents, and addressing the penalties for criminal hacking at a standard that would be 
more intense than what is put forth in the United States CFAA, according to 68 percent of 
survey respondents.  The deficiencies in clear policies being addressed across 
multinational jurisdictions has enabled for lines to be blurred in what is deemed as 
criminal hacking, the true origins of the intrusions, and a codification for bringing those 
responsible for the economically and culturally crippling acts of criminal hacking.  An 
expansion of concerted efforts among multidisciplinary experts in the fields of the threat 
landscape of the cyber realm, security and privacy, policy and law, and the hacking 
culture, as a whole, may help contribute to effective policy solutions for addressing the 
major dilemma we are facing involving the harmful trickling effects of criminal hacking. 
Present day global entities and the future support of humankind depends on an effective 
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Appendix B:  Survey 
This virtually disseminated survey is anonymous and voluntary and all 
information provided will be used to fulfill the requirements for a research study 
dissertation involving an examination of attitudes towards international standards for 
criminal hacking. All answers are anonymous, including not capturing any IP addresses 
through the survey platform. One must be 18 years or older to participate in the survey.  
Around the world there are a number of statements defining computer intrusions, 
or criminal hacking. Definitions include variations of some or all of the following: 
intentionally accessing a protected device without authorization or exceeding authorized 
access. There are also different standards, among various nations, that have been used for 
addressing the penalties for criminal hacking. This study will examine attitudes on 
whether there is a need for one international law that clearly defines criminal hacking and 
the penalties associated with the act.  
1 – Age Group  
Please select which age bracket you are in. 
o 18 to 29 years of age 
o 30 to 39 years of age 
o 40 to 49 years of age 
o 50 to 59 years of age 
o 60 years of age and above 
2 – Ethnicity  




o Asian descent 
o African descent 
o American descent 
o Australian descent 
o Canadian descent 
o European Union descent 
o Hispanic or Latino descent 
o India national descent 
o Middle Eastern descent 
o Russian descent 
o Other 
3 – Gender  
Please specify your gender. 
o Male 
o Female 
4 – Infrastructure Sector Affiliation 
Please indicate the infrastructure sector you are most closely aligned with. 
o Chemical Sector 
o Commercial Facilities Sector 
o Communications Sector 
o Critical Manufacturing Sector 




o Defense Industrial Base Sector 
o Education Sector 
o Emergency Services Sector 
o Energy Sector 
o Financial Services Sector 
o Food and Agriculture Sector 
o Government Facilities Sector 
o Healthcare and Public Health Sector 
o Information Technology Sector 
o Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector 
o Transportation Systems Sector 
o Water and Wastewater Systems Sector 
o Not affiliated with any of the infrastructures provided above 
5 – Technical Hacking Ability  
Please indicate whether you have hacking technical skills or no technical hacking skills. 
o Hacking skills (hacking ability towards any type of technological hacking, 
including ethical hackers, penetrations testers, red team/blue team hackers, bug 
bounty hackers, recreational hackers, education sanctioned hacking, and those 
affiliated with white hat, gray hat, and black hat hacking, to name a few) 
o No technical hacking skills 
6 – Education  




o No schooling or some schooling without a diploma 
o High school graduate or equivalent 
o Trade/technical training or a college degree 
o Master’s degree or higher 
7 – Employment Sector  
Please specify the employment sector you are most closely aligned with. 
o Private sector 
o Public sector 
o Non-Governmental Organization 
o Retired 
o Unable to work 
Using the Likert and Semantic Differential Scales below choose the given options that 
best align with your position for the research questions. 
8 - On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how would you rate your  
1 – Strongly agree 
2 – Somewhat agree 
3 - Neither agree nor disagree 
4 – Disagree 
5 – Strongly disagree 
9 - On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how you would rate your attitude towards the 
need for the penalties of criminal hacking to be addressed under one international law? 




2 – Somewhat agree 
3 - Neither agree nor disagree 
4 – Disagree 
5 – Strongly disagree 
10 - On a scale from 1 to 5 please indicate how you would rate your inclination on the 
extent that criminal hacking should be penalized, given it would be implemented 
globally? See the United States Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) penalties chart 
below, serving as an example for the question. 
1 – No penalties 
2 – Minimal to less than moderate penalties 
3 – Moderate penalties - neither the least of penalties nor the harshest of penalties 
4 – More than moderate penalties 
5 – Harshest of penalties 
Summary of the United States Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) Penalties 
Offense Section in CFAA Sentence* 
Obtaining National Security Information (a)(1) 10 (20) years 
 Accessing a Computer and Obtaining Information (a)(2) 1 or 5 (10) 
Trespassing in a Government Computer (a)(3) 1 (10) 
Accessing a Computer to Defraud & Obtain Value (a)(4) 5 (10) 
 Intentionally Damaging by Knowing Transmission (a)(5)(A) 1 or 10 (20) 
 Recklessly Damaging by Intentional Access (a)(5)(B) 1 or 5 (20) 
Negligently Causing Damage & Loss by Intentional Access (a)(5)(C) 1 (10) 
Trafficking in Passwords (a)(6) 1 (10) 
Extortion Involving Computers (a)(7) 5 (10) 
* The maximum prison sentences for second convictions are noted in parentheses. 
Source: Prosecuting Computer Crimes Manual, p. 3, CCIPS Division of the DOJ 
 
 
 
 
